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This thesis surveys the naval implications of the treaty
outcomes resulting from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT)
.
The fundamental hypothesis is that a correllation
implying a causative relationship exists between the naval
outcomes of SALT I and SALT II (dependent variable) and asym-
metries in U.S. and Soviet negotiating methodology (indepen-
dent variable) . Assessment of the dependent variable is
accomplished through systematic examination of the treaty
outcomes relevant to the naval capabilities of the two nego-
tiating parties. These outcomes include the impact of SALT-
imposed SLBM and SSBN numerical limitations upon fleet
ballistic missile (FBM) force modernization, implications
for sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) , naval air-launched
cruise missiles (ALCMs) , sea-based ABM/ATBM deployment op-
tions, and the naval significance of SALT outcomes relating
to land-based naval air and potential ICBM/IRBM anti-ship
targeting. The independent variable of negotiating approaches
is evaluated through systematic scrutiny of the public SALT
negotiating history. Although evidence is not entirely
conclusive, the hypothesis seems to be sustained.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, few concepts have gained more attention
than diplomatic negotiations for arms control. From a histor-
ical perspective, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks represent
the most important and critical negotiation effort to date.
When president Carter and President Brezhnev signed the Treaty
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms at Vienna on June 18, 1979, SALT had approached nearly a
decade of institutionalized existence. These negotiations
have also been the longest continuous Soviet-American negoti-
ations on record. Notwithstanding the Carter Administration's
active campaign of Congressional testimony and official pro-
nouncements which 'pleaded the case for SALT II ratification,
the Treaty remains an unfinished endeavor with a controversial
past and an uncertain future.
Although the President transmitted the SALT II Treaty and
its related documents for the advice and consent of the U.S.
Senate in June 1979, the deteriorating political atmosphere
attending the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prevented the
realization of his Administration's earlier intention for a
ratification vote on SALT II in early Spring 1980. Senate
floor debate on SALT II was postponed on January 3, 1980, fol-
lowing a Presidential request. As the following editorial

comment suggests, the President's postponement decision was
drawn by the necessity of political reality.
. .
.
the delay was dictated by the political
climate and tactical necessity and did not
mean the administration was withdrawing
the treaty. It continues to support its
passage at a more propitious time. The
delay is thus an effort to save the agree-
ment in the long run.l
The Administration asserted that the delay was primarily
designed to insulate SALT II from other dimensions of Soviet
behavior, which might have negatively influenced the Senate's
ratification decision. This rationale, however, is not con-
sistent with previous statements made in support of SALT II
from key Administration spokesmen. For example, Paul Warnke
,
as head of the U.S. SALT II delegation, maintained that "the
only way that SALT can be sold is on its merits. I believe
the agreement will command itself to anybody who approaches
2
arms control with an objective frame of mind."
Preliminary findings indicate that the Administration's
explanations were in actuality an external facade primarily
designed to screen from public view the most imminent threat
to Senate SALT II ratification, which was not directly related
to events in Afghanistan. On balance, when the postponement
decision was announced by the White House, prospects for SALT
II ratification were already doubtful. SALT II had drawn much
opposition from a well-informed and highly critical body of
strategic and arms control analysts whose articulate criticisms-
with two major themes - had jeopardized ratification irrespective
of any external political crises.

The first critical theme was that significant and adverse
incongruities existed in the framework of SALT II Treaty out-
comes. As a result, the treaty as proposed by the Carter
Administration was not in our national security interest.
Two examples are the cruise missile restrictions in the SALT
II Protocol and the exclusion of the Soviet Backfire bomber
from the numerical limitations established in the basic SALT
II Treaty text. The negotiated outcomes of SALT I likewise
received critical appraisal in hindsight. SALT I, it was
argued, constituted U.S. acquiescence to a cumulative strategic
advantage for the Soviet Union by quantitatively codifying
U.S. inferiority in both the numbers of ICBMs and submarine
launched ballistic missiles.
The second major body of SALT II criticism emerged as a
result of perceived negotiating asymmetries in the SALT pro-
cess from its basic inception. In the words of Foy D. Kohler,
former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union:
The failure of the U.S. side to recognize,
much less to react effectively to, the
skill, purposefulness , and ruthlessness
with which the Soviets have approached
and sought to exploit the SALT negotiations
has constituted a fundamental weakness
in the U.S. conduct of the negotiations
that has kept us continually off-balance
and repeatedly placed us at serious dis-
advantage.
*
In short, the critics insisted, the United States has been
severely impaired from a negotiation perspective due in large
measure to alarming deficiencies in both our analytical and

operational approach to SALT. Accordingly, one must ask how
this particular state of affairs evolved.
The lessons of pre-SALT negotiating experience are avail-
able in an abundant body of literature which has established
a basic framework dealing precisely with the problem of dis-
similarities in bilateral Soviet-American negotiation behavior.
Although it is not suggested that the Soviets consistently
demonstrate a static all-embracing model of negotiating style,
there are nevertheless a number of crucial behavioral regular-
ities in their SALT negotiation strategy which the United
States failed to conceptualize and counter. For example, Dr.
William R. Van Cleave, in SALT I Senate testimony, identified
what he believes to be the primary Soviet approach to SALT.
The Soviets, he contends, do not see the SALT negotiations as
"a cooperative process - as one in which both sides perceived
the objectives and urgencies similarly." Rather, Van Cleave
concludes, "The Soviet Union. .. seems clearly to have regarded
SALT as another competitive endeavor, where the objective is
unilateral advantage and where one can gain at the expense of
4
of the other." This zero-sum approach to negotiation is at
variance with the traditional Western negotiating practice of
accomodative negotiation utilized by the U.S. throughout SALT.
Unfortunately, the U.S. predicated its strategy on the mistaken




One last but exceedingly important fact must also be taken
into consideration. Although President Carter's hand might
have been forced by the imperatives of tactical necessity,
and the delay in consideration of SALT II has temporarily
prevented ratification, the United States has been effectively
abiding by the terms of SALT II in a de facto arrangement since
treaty signature. In contrast, the Soviet Union's strategic
force modernization efforts have continued. The Soviets have
taken several actions which appear to violate the spirit, and
in some cases the letter, of not only the still-pending SALT
II Treaty, but also of the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement,
which both parties agreed to observe beyond its October 1977
expiration date on a reciprocal basis. To illustrate, in
January of this year the Soviets test-launched their new
"Typhoon" SLBM on the White Sea with 70 to 80% of its radioed
telemetry signals in an encoded mode. Such encryption is not
consistent with the spirit of SALT I and is in violation of
SALT II provisions which require that the Soviets not use
"deliberate concealment" measures which impair the ability of
the U.S. to determine whether they are testing "heavy SLBMs."
To reiterate, SALT opponents maintain that a decade of
negotiation has basically institutionalized U.S. accommodation,
tranquilized the American public, undermined efforts to support
an adequate defense, and (by implication), signaled our un-
willingness to reverse adverse military trends. As former
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird remarked, "The much-touted

SALT II 'process' of 'delicate' and 'intricate' negotiations
has in fact proved to be a series of American retreats before
a vigorous and determined Soviet government... This treaty,
wrought in the closed rooms of Geneva where accommodation and
acquiescence have answered Soviet intransigence and pathological
secrecy, does not fare well in the open light of honest
debate." 6
The criticisms of the SALT process reviewed above are so
striking that they constitute a justification for in-depth
analysis of a particular facet of SALT outcomes. Despite
considerable commentary on a variety of substantive issues
underlying SALT, very little has appeared in respect to a
comprehensive comparative appraisal of SALT from a naval per-
spective. This is a deficiency which the present study strives
to correct. Such an analysis seems particularly significant,
given the increasing dependence of the U.S. strategic Triad
upon its sea-based component, as technological improvements
in Soviet strategic force modernization continue to erode the
survivability of the other two pillars of our strategic defense.
This study is therefore intended to test the hypothesis
that a correlation implying a causative relationship may
exist between the naval outcomes of SALT I and SALT II (de-
pendent variable) and asymmetries in U.S. and Soviet negotiating
methodologies (independent variable). In other words, to
what extent do the apparently divergent negotiating approaches
explain the contrasting treaty outcomes as regards naval
12

forces? Although causative linkages probably cannot be
definitively established, it is assumed that clear concept-
ualization and scrupulous weighing of the available evidence
will help in formulating qualitative judgments regarding the
relative impact of the principle independent variable and
other relevant independent variables.
13

II. SALT TREATY OUTCOMES
This chapter is intended to provide a detailed background
to the specific naval implications of SALT I and SALT II out-
comes. Primarily, this analysis will concentrate on an
assessment of SALT'S impact upon sea-based ABM systems, the
potential threat to naval forces from land-based ICBMs and
sea-based ballistic missiles, SLBM and SSBN numerical limits,
naval air-launched cruise missiles, the Backfire bomber exclu-
sion, and the deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles.
A. SALT I
On 26 May 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union
completed a two and a half year negotiation endeavor known as
SALT I. The negotiated outcomes of SALT I consisted of two
major arms control agreements. The first was the treaty be-
tween the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems, and the second was the Interim Agreement between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms. By any measurement, both agree-
ments inherently have significant implications for the future




Approached from a synoptic perspective, the ABM Treaty
can be characterized as a quantitative, qualitative and geo-
graphic constraint upon strategic defensive armaments. A
summary of the principal provisions can be characterized as
follows:
1. Neither side is permitted to deploy a nation-
wide ABM defense or a base for such a defense.
2. Each side is permitted to deploy a limited
defense of two areas - the national capital
and one area containing ICBM's. In each
defense area, out to a 150 km radius, each
side is permitted up to 100 ABM launchers
and interceptors and a limited radar base
for these interceptors.
3. Neither side is permitted to give ABM capa-
bility to non-ABM systems, e.g., air defense
systems.
4. Verification will be by national means. The
parties have agreed not to interfere with
these means.
5. The treaty will be of unlimited duration. ,
Withdrawal is permitted for supreme interest.
a. Implications for Sea-based Development, Testing
and Deployment
The actual and potential implications of the ABM
Treaty upon naval systems and capabilities are essentially
outlined in Article V, Paragraph 1. Specifically, "Each party
undertakes not to develop, t-est, or deploy ABM systems or
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or
mobile land-based." 4 Effectively, this provision has resulted
in the limiting of ABM systems and their defined components
15

which may be developed, tested, or deployed to a fixed land-
based mode, thereby prohibiting a sea-based ABM system or a
sea-based ABM component, such as a shipborne phased-array radar
linked to land-based ABM launchers and interceptor missiles,
for the unlimited duration of the treaty. When viewed from a
U.S. naval perspective, interpretation of the imposed limita-
tions of the ABM treaty could potentially complicate efforts
i
by the U.S. to counter naval threats through the development
of modern naval defense systems intended for defense against
air-breathing threats or against tactical ballistic missiles.
b. Historical Development of a Sea-based ABM
Concept and SABMIS
The U.S. Navy's initial interest in a sea-based
missile defense concept was stimulated prior to the termina-
tion of the Second World War when the Navy became increasingly
concerned over the threat of Japanese kamikaze tactics. As
a result, Project Bumblebee, directed by John Hopkins Applied
Physics Laboratory under the auspices of the Navy, began in-
vestigating possible methods of protecting naval carrier attack
forces at sea from kamikaze and other alien projectile threats.
The Talos, Terrier and Tarter family of shipboard surface-to-
air missiles were developed from this original research.
In particular, the Talos weapon system was to even-
tually have a role in the highly intense interservice ABM
controversy which emerged in the late 1950' s. As one might
expect, the Navy at this particular point in time was willing

to participate in the interservice competition over ABM
development, and in 1959, it recommended the Talos missile
for an ABM interceptor role. James Baar in 1959 discussed
the possible application of this early sea-based AICBM (anti-
intercontinental ballistic missile) concept:
...Talos would be used to bat down
missiles fired against carriers,
cruisers, and other surface ships.
It also might be developed for de-
fense of continental United States
against ICBM's and missiles fired
from submarines .. .The significance of
the development of a seagoing AICBM
in the evolution of U.S. strategy-
would be very great.
°
However, the Navy "did not vigorously seek out
7
this mission as a vital part of its overall strategic programs."
Early roles and missions assignments basically explain this
decision. While the Army and Air Force were embattled over
the issue of ABM from 1956 to 1958, the Navy was primarily
interested in promoting inter-service support for the develop-
ment of the Polaris ballistic missile submarine program.
However, as Morton Halperin reveals, the Navy still
wished to proceed with ABM in a way
which kept open the possibility that
later additions to this system would
include a Navy-controlled sea-based
system. In return for Army support of
the Navy system, the Navy was prepared
to support an Army (land-based system.
Moreover, the Navy was concerned, as
was the Air Force, with maintaining the
system of unanimous Joint Chiefs of





Thus, the Navy's role in ABM competition tempor-
arily became one of passive neutrality.
Navy interest in a sea-based ABM system did even-
tually reemerge, as demonstrated by increased emphasis on a
research and development program known as the Sea-based Anti-
ballistic Missile Intercept System (SABMIS) , which was
considered by the Navy to be an alternative to the Army's
ground-based BMD systems. SABMIS was an outgrowth of long-
range strategic studies conducted by the Chief of Naval
Operations, and in February 1967, the Navy formed the Office
of Strategic and Defense Systems, under the CNO with Rear Adm.
qGeorge H. Miller as director. Operationally, the Navy
envisioned ABM radars and interceptor missiles mounted on
surface combatants and interceptors mounted on submarines de-
ployed in the Northwestern Pacific and the North Atlantic.
By offering defense in-depth, it was argued that SABMIS would
complement land-based BMD systems by intercepting ICBM's and
SLBM's in mid- trajectory , thereby reducing the problem land-
based systems had in respect to discrimination between possible
decoys and the true warhead. Furthermore, with the development
of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)
technology, the mid-trajectory intercept provided by SABMIS
had a potential of being substantially more effective than
the terminal defense systems of the Nike X-Sentinel-Safeguard
variety. Additional factors supporting a mobile sea-based
concept were multipurpose integration, deployment mobility
18

in time of crisis, and the political advantages derived from
providing flexible ballistic missile defense to allies. How-
ever, this sea-based ABM concept was developed too late. Both
SALT I and the 10-year development advantage of the Nike-X
System inhibited further development of SABMIS.
In 1970, amidst the background of the SALT I nego-
tiations, the Navy was still calling for continued research
on SABMIS. Admiral Moorer, as Chief of Naval Operations,
specifically emphasized continued Navy interest in the program
during congressional testimony before a House Subcommittee of
the Committee on Appropriations at the DOD FY 1971 Appropria-
tions Hearings. As reflected in this testimony, SABMIS was
then OSD-approved (for R § D only), with fiscal year 1970 and
FY 1971 funding at $1.5 million and 1.2 million respectively.
"This austere funding level," he remarked, "precludes comple-
tion of concept formulation as specified in the Naval Material
Command Plan." In justifying SAMBIS, Admiral Moorer' s de-
fense was based on the following strategic assessment.
Comparison of the United States and USSR
land geography, population and industrial
distribution, and strategic forces instal-
lations show a relative advantage for the
Soviet Union in available land deployment
area. The Russian geography is such that
the Soviet urban and industrial areas are
protected by extensive land buffer zones,
whereas the majority of the urban/industrial
areas of the United States are immediately
exposed to attacks from across our borders
and seacoasts... SABMIS units can provide
defense-in-depth, mobility, a shoot- look- shoot
capability, autonomous operation...^ 2
19

SABMIS, however, was never a viable or continuous
ABM program, as demonstrated by its relatively meager budget,
and one can only assume from the available evidence, notwith-
standing Admiral Moorer's argument, that SABMIS ranked low on
any measurable priority scale during SALT I. As John B.
Rhinelander notes, the constraints on future ABM systems was
a U.S. and not a Soviet proposal. Furthermore, evidence
suggests that the implications of these restrictions appear
to have escaped significant debate between U.S. and Soviet
negotiators. This is demonstrated by the fact that agreement
on the basic prohibitions in paragraph 1 of Article V was
reached relatively early in the negotiations, and "neither
side had pushed ABM programs which would be affected by this
14paragraph." Furthermore, as John Newhouse writes of the
U.S. Navy, "the Navy no longer cared about ABM's and left to
itself would have taken any kind of limit." This suggests
that concomitant to the SALT I negotiations, the Navy developed
a relative lack of interest in protecting or pursuing the
development of a concept which had, up to that time, received
only superficial attention. Admiral Moorer's post SALT I
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the
Military Implications of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Offen-
sive Agreement only reinforce this conclusion. He states
"the Navy has no system that is prohibited by the ABM Treaty,
so there is little impact on the Navy in this regard." In
hindsight, this appears to demonstrate a certain lack of
20

vision, since the tactical application of naval ABM defense
has gained in merit as the potential vulnerability of naval
counterforce targets such as aircraft carriers and SSBN s to
ballistic missile attack has become increasingly recognized
- as will be discussed in the following section of this
chapter.
c. Tactical Ballistic Missile Threat
Despite persistent iteration by Soviet strategic
and naval writers who suggest the possible tactical applica-
tion of ICBMs and SLBMs in a naval environment, few Western
naval analysts have, until very recently, recognized or
addressed the implications of such a mission. As evidenced
by the following statement of Admiral Kasatonov, Soviet ref-
erences to such possibilities existed as early as 1961.
The essence of the problem is to create
effective means for the distant destruction
of submarines from the air which will make
it possible to employ for their destruction
the most effective modern means of destruc-
tion-missiles with nuclear charges launched
from submarines, aircraft and ships and ,-
possibly also from shore launching mounts ,
(emphasis added)
Although Admiral Kasatonov referred specifically
to an ASW employment, utilization of such a system would also
appear applicable against U.S. attack carriers, which were
correspondingly perceived by the Soviets as a direct sea-
based threat when staged within aircraft striking range of
the Soviet Union. Robert Herrick's assessment of Soviet naval
21

strategy strongly suggests a tactically oriented role when he
emphasizes that one of the primary missions of the Soviet
Navy is the destruction of the enemy fleet.
Whatever the facts of the wartime mission
assigned the USSR's ballistic missile sub-
marine force, it would be well to keep
in mind, in view of widespread misconcep-
tions on this score, that the Soviet Navy's
basic wartime mission is definitely not
submarine- launched strategic nuclear
strikes at the United States. Rather, it
is the destruction of the submarine, sur -
face ship, and naval air forces of those
powers
. As Admiral Alafuzov has emphati-
cally stated: "In a future war... The
basic mission of our Navy will be to
combat the Navy of the enemy. "I 8
(emphasis added)
Admiral of the Fleet S.G. Gorshkov reinforced this
analysis when he wrote about fleet against fleet activities,
The new possibilities of a fleet in opera-
tions against the shore and the resulting
serious threat from oceanic directions have
determined the character of the main efforts
of a fleet in the struggle against an enemy
fleet. The most important of them has be-
come the use of the forces of the fleet
against the naval strategic nuclear systems
of the enemy with the aim of disrupting
or weakening to the maximum their strikes
on ground objectives.19 (emphasis added)
More specifically, another Soviet admiral wrote
earlier in a 1972 Soviet Navy Day article:
Submarines armed with ballistic missiles are
capable of destroying ships at a distance
of hundreds of kilometers and of delivering
blows from beneath the water at strategic




Norman Polmar addressed the possible naval impli-
cations of Soviet tactical ballistic missiles in an article
written in 1976, and suggested that the Soviets may poten-
tially assign IRBM s or ICBM s against mobile naval targets.
As he points out:
This tactic may be related to the state-
ment by the Soviet Defense Minister in
1972 that the strategic rocket forces
had allocated some of their missiles to
"naval groupings" at sea. The large
payloads of Soviet ICBM's permit very
large thermo-nuclear warheads with a
large radius of destruction to compen-
sate for submarine movement during
missile flight; or possibly a terminal
guidance system for localization could
be developed. 21
Some evidence suggests that the Soviets did intend
to operationally develop the capability of utilizing SLBM s
and possibly ICBM s in a tactical mode. In May 1972, the
Soviets effectively constrained the future employment of sea-
based ABM systems capable of defending naval task groups from
tactical ballistic missile attack. In 1973, the Soviet Navy
began testing the SS-NX-13, a 500-kilometer submarine launched
ballistic missile with an inflight homing capability. Util-
izing data received during flight from an on board sensor,
the SS-NX-13 was believed to have been intentionally designed
to vary its impact point up to 50 kilometers thereby optimizing
its potential threat to mobile seaborne targets. The basic
characteristics of the SS-NX-13 would include:
23

» A range of 100 to 600 nautical miles
• An apogee (maximum altitude) of 150
nautical miles
• Two stages
• A sensor (undefined) which "locks on" to
the target near apogee
• Terminal stage maneuvers to allow impact
at the sensor-detected target coordinates,
offset from the initial ballistic impact
point
2 2
• Submarine launch capability.
Michael MccGwire's analysis of the development of
the SS-NX-13 indicates that it was probably intended as a
newly designed weapon system for the Soviet Y-class SSBN, and
that it would have been deployed for ASW purposes. Although
no apparent rationale has been offered for the abrupt termin-
ation of the SS-NX-13 program in November 1973, some sources
suggest that
The decision not to deploy the SS-NX-13
seems to have resulted not from any failure
related to its anti-ship capability but
rather from its failure to provide a suf-
ficient anti-submarine capability. As
cited by Admiral Gorshkov, the increased
range in U. S. ' submarine- launched ballistic
missiles - provided by the Trident system
has resulted in expanding the area for
trajectory maneuver (changing launch posi-
tion) , and thus potential target areas
by two orders of -magnitude. 23
As indicated by Admiral Gorshkov, the tactical
problem presented by increased target range could be resolved
by incorporating "The tactical mutual support of mixed forces
in the battle against strategic nuclear weapons platforms,"

by utilizing "the capabilities of other branches of the armed
forces to operate in concert with the Navy in the Navy's sphere
24
of missions." Such statements strongly suggest the possible
supplemental deployment of land-based ICBM s
,
such as the
SS-16 or SS-18, in an anti-ship/anti-submarine role. The
SS-NX-13 test conceivably demonstrated the necessary require-
ment of a terminal retargeting capability for tactical ballistic
i
missile targeting. Additionally, the Soviets have demonstrated
that they have the technical capability to deliver RVs to
possible Trident operating areas by launching ICBMs to naval
operating areas and through the simultaneous development of
four ICBMs , one of which has displayed a range capability well
25beyond that required for strikes against the United States.
It is possible that, from a Soviet perspective, the most
significant potential seaborne offensive threats were per-
ceived as:
Trident (Poseidon)
Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM)
Attack carriers
»
If so, the continued development and deployment of a long
range tactical ballistic missile capability from a variety
of sea-based and land-based launchers seems consistent with
the requirements for effectively extending the range of
counterforce targeting against surface and submerged naval
platforms. Table 2-1 illustrates the potential application
of Soviet ballistic missiles in this tactical anti-ship/anti-
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in conjunction with the effective restrictions of the ABM
treaty and the Soviet surplus in ICBM throwweight codified
in the Interim Offensive Agreement (and SALT II), only sup-
ports the argument that the Soviets could afford to spare
some ICBMs
,
SLBM s or non-SALT - regulated IRBMs for the
naval purposes expressed above. Thus, the potential deploy-
ment of some form of a Soviet tactical ballistic missile with
naval application should become a matter for serious thought,
d. Impact on ATBM and AEGIS
The development of an anti- tactical ballistic mis-
sile (ATBM) system would at first glance be difficult to
justify in view of the provisions established in the ABM
Treaty. However, as Captain L. F. Brooks recently suggested,
such a system could probably be legally undertaken without
technically violating the explicit terms of the ABM Treaty.
Developing a counter to a tactical ballistic
missile system cannot be undertaken lightly
in view of the questions it raises with
respect to the 1972 antiballistic missile
(ABM) Treaty which banned, among other
things, sea-based ABMs. Still, although
the Soviets would clearly not be pleased
with the deployment of such a counter, the
Treaty defines an ABM as "a system to counter
strategic ballistic missiles'* (emphasis
added) and thus an antitactical ballistic
missile system is probably legal. 26
However, analysis of Article VI, paragraph (a), imposes
an additional restriction which Captain Brooks appears to




(a) Not to give missiles, launchers, or
radars, other than ABM interceptor mis-
siles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars,
capabilities to counter strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements
in flight trajectory, and not to test
them in an ABM mode... 2
7
This provision effectively prohibits any ATBM capable
system such as that proposed by Captain Brooks. Notwithstand-
ing likely Soviet objections, the development of such a system
would also have a number of internally imposed constraints to
overcome, as demonstrated by the difficulties encountered by
the Navy's nuclear-tipped SM-2 anti-aircraft missile. This
variant of the SM-2 was to be a part of the advanced AEGIS
air defense weapon system, which was originally designed to
defend naval forces against Soviet ASM and aircraft threats
in the 1980' s and beyond.
Primary threats include Soviet ALCM s (e.g. AS-4, AS-6,
and their successors, launched by Backfire or Badger bombers),
SLCM s
,
(e.g. the supersonic SS-N-12 launched from Kiev class
ASW carriers), and submarine launched cruise missiles (e.g.,
the SS-N-7, SS-N-9, SS-N-3a, SS-N-12, and the SS-NX-19). The
Navy contends that a definite requirement exists for the
deployment of an Aegis/nuclear SM-2 for two primary reasons.
First, Navy studies indicated that conventional armed SM-2
systems may be inadequate to counter high altitude nuclear-
armed cruise missiles. The nuclear variant is primarily de-
signed to render the warhead of an attacking cruise missile
ineffective. It was further argued, that the increased

emphasis upon tactical nuclear warfighting at sea adds a
second dimension.
U.S. naval planners believe it important
to retain a nuclear air defense capability
on U.S. surface combatants to be able to
threaten a nuclear response to Soviet
attack on U.S. naval forces. Uncertainty
in the minds of Soviet planners as to how
the U.S. might respond to hostile actions -
because of the presence of nuclear armed
SM-2 aboard U.S. warships - may serve to
strengthen deterrence of such attacks in
time of crisis. 28
In 1978, the Senate Armed Services Committee authorized
the FY 79 DOD funds requested for the nuclear tipped SM-2.
However, an important caveat was attached; the use of these
funds was embargoed until the administration filed an arms
29
control impact statement on the weapon. The delay impli-
cit in this decision apparently resulted from an intense
policy debate over the SALT-related implications of this
particular nuclear warhead variant of the Navy's SM-2 anti-
aircraft missile. As indicated in published congressional
accounts,
Technical issues were involved to some
extent. The nuclear warhead, for
example, might blind the Aegis radar
to other approaching missiles. But the
major issues involved arms control
policy.
Some administration officials feared
that the nuclear SM-2 warhead guided
by AEGIS would be so effective that
it might upset the 1972 U.S. -Soviet
Treaty limiting the production of
anti-ballistic missile systems. 30
?Q

The Administration's Fiscal Year 1980 Arms Control Impact
Statements reveal that production of the SM-2 nuclear warhead
was still being deferred pending completion of a Presidentially-
directed study of its military utility and arms control impact
,
even though a nuclear-armed SM-2 in conjunction with AEGIS
"would not be inconsistent with U.S. arms control obligations
under the treaty." However, "further study of the implications
of continued substantial deployment of nuclear SAMs will be
carried out and evaluated before a decision to procure a
nuclear warhead for the SM-2 system is authorized." 31 How-
ever, a position began to emerge in the FY 81 ACIS. It con-
cluded that AEGIS with a nuclear SM-2 would not be precluded
by the ABM Treaty, and furthermore, it would not be inconsis-
tent with U.S. arms control obligations. Furthermore, it
indicated that,
It would be very desirable, although dif-
ficult, to reach an agreed demarcation among
modern defense systems, to differentiate
among those intended for defense against
air-breathing threats, against tactical bal-
listic missiles or against strategic ballis-
tic missiles. To constrain U.S. programs
without firm categorization criteria could
result in the U.S. being more self-con-
strained than the Soviet Union in developing
high performance air defense and anti-tactical
ballistic missile (ATBM) systems. 32
Such references are important indicators that the signi-
ficance of naval ATBM defense is beginning to be recognized.
Although the ABM Treaty prohibits testing "in an ABM" mode,
it was indicated that all potential U.S. testing of the AEGIS/

nuclear SM-2 would be consistent with our understanding of
this restriction, that is, "The system will not be tested
against strategic ballistic missiles." 33 Nevertheless, the
administration remarked that before a decision to procure and
deploy a nuclear warhead for the SM-2 system is authorized,
a careful evaluation of the relative advantages and dis-
advantages must be completed. This evaluation would there-
fore necessitate the review of such factors as:
The inconsistency of greater
number of nuclear anti-air war-
fare ships with the administration's
policy of seeking reductions in
nuclear forces
• The system's uncertain effect on
deterrence
• The problem of timely release
authority*
Thus, as the matter now stands, the AEGIS/nuclear armed SM-2
missile continues to remain constrained, if not directly, by
SALT and related arms control issues.
2 . Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms
Within the agreed framework for negotiation outlined
in the Joint Statement of May 20, 1971, the United States and
the Soviet Union indirectly linked the ABM Treaty to what was
to become the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms. As stipulated, the United States and the
Soviet Union "have agreed to concentrate this year on working
out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of

antiballistic missile systems (ABMs) . They have also agreed
that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs
,
they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limita-
tion of offensive strategic weapons."
As the name implies, the Interim Agreement was designed
as a temporary agreement placing certain quantitative con-
straints upon offensive strategic systems. It was further
intended that a more comprehensive permanent treaty would
replace it prior to expiration. The basic framework of the
Interim Agreement provided for an established freeze on new
construction ICBM launchers in combination with numerical
limits on SSBNs and SLBM launchers. A general summary of the
Interim Agreement's impact could be outlined as follows:
1. Each side is permitted to keep any fixed
land based ICBM launchers currently
operational or under construction. No
new fixed land based ICBM launchers
may be built.
2. The Soviets may complete the 313 modern
large ballistic missile launchers, e.g.
for SS-9 class missiles, currently
operational and under construction.
No new ones may be built.
3. Neither side my convert to modern large
ballistic missile launchers or any other
ICBM launchers.
4. Each side may keep any SLBM launchers
operational or under construction.
Also, newer SLBM launchers may be
built as replacements for older SLBM
launchers or for older heavy ICBM
launchers.
5. Verification will be by national means.
The parties have agreed not to interfere
with these means.

6. The duration of the Agreement is five
years. Withdrawal is permitted for
supreme interest. The parties have
agreed in the ABM Treaty to continue
active negotiations for limitations
on strategic offensive arms. 35
A signed Protocol was also attached to the Interim
Agreement, which provided additional details on the ballistic
missile submarine and SLBM launcher limitations,
a. SLBM and SSBN Numerical Limits
Article III of the Interim Agreement, the attached
Protocol, and Initialed Statement (K) all pertain to restric-
tions upon ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers.
Critics of the Treaty contend that these are the most diffi-
cult provisions of the Interim Agreement to understand.
Analysis will demonstrate that these criticisms are justi-
fiable.
As stipulated in Article III, each Party agreed to
limit SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines
to the numbers operational and under construction on the date
of signature. This effectively limited the U.S. to 656 and
the Soviets to 740 SXBM launchers on "nuclear powered sub-
marines'* as a baseline ceiling. When the provisions of the
Protocol are taken into account, these baseline figures are
adjusted upwards by what Thomas Wolfe characterized as a
"complicated trade-off formula." For the U.S. this adjusted
ceiling cannot exceed 710 SLBM launchers on no more than 44
"modern ballistic missile submarines", and for the Soviets,

no more than 950 SLBM launchers on no more than 62 "modern
ballistic missile submarines." Any excess over 656 SLBM
launchers for the U.S. and 740 SLBM launchers for the Soviets
could only become operational if replaced by an equal number
of pre-established "Ballistic missile launchers of older
types deployed prior to 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers
on older submarines." (This apparently refers to 54 Titan II
i
launchers for the U.S. and 210 SS-7 and SS-8 ICBM's or older
SLBM launchers for the Soviets.)
For the U.S., these provisions could be plainly inter-
preted. At Treaty signature in May 1972, the U.S. had 41
SSBNs and 656 SLBM launchers with no new construction under
way.
The ambiguity of the text, however, becomes apparent
when trying to interpret the Treaty's defined limits for
Soviet ballistic missile submarine and SLBM launcher levels.
In a post SALT-I press conference, Dr. Kissinger indicated
that "the base number of Soviet submarines is in dispute.
It has been in dispute in our intelligence estimate exactly
how much it is, though our intelligence estimates are in the
7 £L
range that was suggested." Thus, no concrete U.S. consensus
existed as to the precise number of Soviet ballistic missile
submarines operational or under construction. In addition,
no defined agreement between the Soviets and the U.S. existed
as to whether "under construction" as used in Article III,
included only those submarines being assembled, as proposed

by the U.S., or whether it also included those further back
in the production cycle (e.g. beginning with the prefabrica-
77
tion of hull sections).
To further complicate the calculation, the Soviets
had at the time of signature a number of submarine classes,
both diesel and nuclear, which had SLBM launchers deployed.
This included at the time approximately 22-G-class SSB s and
9 H-class SSBN s
. Close analysis of the provisions indicate
that a number of basic incongruities in the specified terms
of the Treaty provided loopholes in respect to both these
classes. These incongruities find substance in the interpre-
tive awkwardness with which these provisions were written, as
demonstrated by their lack of definitional clarity and poorly
worded text. For instance, one could assume, from a Soviet
perspective, that since older G-class SSB's and H-class SSBN's
were not "modern ballistic missile submarines," they would not
be accountable under the maximum allowable limit of 62. No
precise definition of "modern" as used in this example existed
within the agreement. A second example can be seen in respect
to the SLBM launchers deployed on these two submarine classes.
There was no precise definition as to what constituted a
"modern SLBM." Since the H-class submarine was nuclear powered,
its SS-N-5 missiles were accountable under the 740 baseline
ceiling. However, the Soviets argued that SS-N-4 and SS-N-5
SLBM launchers on G-class were not accountable for any ceiling,
since they were not "modern SLBMs." Such abnormalities

subsequently became the subject of M a major struggle between
American and Soviet negotiators before and after the signing
of the SALT I accords that was reportedly not resolved until
the July 1974 summit." 38
Most SALT I analysts agree that the numerical SSBN
and SLBM imbalances written into the Interim Agreement consti-
tuted an unfortunate development but were not strategicall signi-
ficant at the time, since similar U.S. systems enjoyed
substantial qualitative advantages. These factors included
MIRV capability, ASW assets, SLBM range and accuracy calcula-
tion, geographical asymmetries, etc. Kissinger, therefore,
was able to later argue that the SS-N-4 and SS-N-5 configured
G-class SSB's added only marginally to the existing Soviet
39
strategic capabilities. However, what he failed to mention
and perhaps failed to visualize was how the deployment of a new
SLBM such as the SS-N-13 might significantly alter this cal-
culation. A G-class SSB configured with such a weapon would
have offered a potent counterforce threat to our sea-based
strategic platforms. Another argument suggested that owing
to the relatively noisy acoustic signature characteristics
of the Y-class SSBN s , and the fact that they were highly
vulnerable to detection, localization and attack by Western
ASW forces in such transit choke points as the G-I-UK gap,
the Soviets were justified in wanting higher numerical limits.
However, the introduction of the D-class SSBN and the long-
range SS-N-8 SLBM the following year undermined this Soviet

geographical asymmetry rationale for higher SLBM requirements.
The SS-N-8 represented a major qualitative improvement and
effectively permitted the Soviets to cover continental U.S.
targets while protected in home waters, such as the Barents
Sea, which have been sanitized of any ASW threat. With its
4,200 NM range, the SS-N-8 gave the Soviets a range capability
greater than our Trident I.
b. Soviet Strategic Sea-based Development
Soviet quantitative and qualitative upgrading
of fleet ballistic missile forces has continued. The Delta
III SSBN (with 24 SLBM launchers) and the SS-NX-18 liquid fuel
SLBM with a post-boost vehicle capable of dispensing three
MIRVs were introduced. The Y-class SS-N-6 also recieved quali-
tative improvements. The MOD- 2 extended the SS-N-6 missile
range and MOD- 3 provided multiple RV delivery to this range.
A new SLBM, the SS-NX-17, with greater accuracy and range than
the SS-N-6, and is expected to be back fitted into some or
all of these older Y-class submarines. Post-SALT I production
of the Y-class reached the 34 boat/540 SLBM level. By April
1978, controversy was raised over the number of operational
D-class submarines. Numerous unofficial sources argued that
the Soviets had 30 operational Deltas, which would have placed
them in violation of the established 62 boat, 950 SLBM SALT I
ceiling. The Defense Department, although conceding that the
40
Soviets had 64 SSBNs , added that two were not yet operational.
Verification of such findings however, is difficult to

substantiate. Technically, dismantling of older SLBM launchers
is required to commence M at the time of the beginning of sea
trials of a replacement submarine, and will be completed in
the shortest possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling
or destruction, and timely notification thereof, will be
accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing
Consultative Commission."
The proceedings of the SCC however, are kept in
confidence. As Paragraph 8 of the SCC regulations states:
The proceedings of the Standing Consultative
Commission shall be conducted in private.
The Standing Consultative Commission may
not make its proceedings public except with
the express consent of both commissioners. 2
The Soviets have consistently expressed to the U.S. their
concern about the importance of this confidentiality in the
work of the SCC and about the official U.S. Government publi-
cation of data pertaining to these discussions.
One document, however, issued by the Carter
Administration in 1979, might offer some insight into past
Soviet compliance behavior. This study, prepared by the
National Security Council for use by the Senate Intelligence
Committee, specifically indicated that there were 11 attempts
by the Soviets to conceal various aspects of its missile and
SSBN programs from U.S. national technical means of verifi-
cation. Although it stressed that most of these compliance
issues had been satisfactorily resolved, the report asserted
that one longstanding question pertaining to Soviet compliance
behavior- had yet to be settled.

In 1976, it says, the United States dis-
covered that the Soviet Union had deployed
791 submarine- launched missiles without
fully deactivating 51 older, land -based
rockets . 43
In. the face of this record, the U.S. has merely
questioned Soviet behavior, and has never officially charged
the Soviets with a violation. Harold Brown's Department of
Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1980 does not help to
clarify compliance questions. His figures indicate that the
Soviets had "around 29 operational Delta submarines" and 34
Yankee class SSBNs. The lack of precision through modifiers
such as "around" may be intended to carefully distract the
public's knowledge of a possible violation. According to a
1979 review of the Soviet Navy by Donald C. Daniel there was
tentative evidence suggesting that the Soviets had, in 1979,
tapered down SSBN production. As indicated, SALT I appeared
to be a factor influencing this trend, since at the time they
were credited with having 63 modern ballistic missile sub-
44
marines, which was one unit over the permissable SALT I limits.
In an article written the following year, Daniel indicates the
Soviets had begun removing Yankee class submarines from stra-
tegic service in order to accommodate the continued deploy-
45
ment of the Delta III class.
Continued production of the Delta III, and the
recent launching from Severodvinsk in the fall of 1980 of a
new class SSBN, the Typhoon, capable of firing 20 SS-NX-18
SLBM s or the recently tested Typhoon SLBM, is evidence of a

continued long-term Soviet objective toward maximizing the
qualitative capabilities of their sea-based offensive capa-
bilities within the advantagious numerical balance established
in SALT I. Although the Y-class submarines are, as suggested,
being deactivated from ballistic missile service, they still
have a reasonable and useful service life remaining. Two
potential options come into mind in respect to Yankee con-
version. The most probable possibility, at least for the
near future, would be the conversion of existing Yankee's
into a SSGN configuration. A noise reduction program, in
conjunction with the Yankee's speed capabilities and a capa-
bility of launching advanced ASW cruise missiles or long-range
anti-ship SLCMs
,
would significantly enhance the VMF's war-
fighting capabilities at sea in both qualitative and quanti-
tative aspects. Furthermore, this program could be carried
out consistent with SALT I. From both a political and mili-
tary perspective, this would be an extremely viable option.
A second option, although less likely to develop
owing to its political and military implications, would be
to replace the existing SS-N-6 or SS-N-17 SLBM's with nomin-
ally tactical ballistic missile systems. This substitution
of newer types of ballistic missiles for older SLBMs could
possibly constitute violation of the SALT I Treaty SLBM ceil-
ings, except that the treaty does not discriminate between
tactical and strategic ballistic missiles. Either option
increases the vulnerability of existing and potential U.S.
40

sea-based strategic and tactical platforms, such as our SSBN s
,
SLCM surface units and carriers. Additionally, each option
reinforce Admiral Gorshkov's assertion that
The employment of Naval Forces against
the enemies seaborne strategic nuclear
systems in order to disrupt or blunt
their attacks against ground targets
to the maximum degree has become the
most important of (the Navy's) efforts.
c. U.S. Strategic Sea-based Development
In contrast with the perhaps questionable post-
SALT I development efforts by the Soviets, the U.S. has
consistently complied with all the provisions of the Interim
Agreement. The two primary SALT I implications affecting
U.S. sea-based strategic forces are first, the limits on
SLBM launchers and SSBN numbers, and second, the dismantlement
requirements.
Given the critical role of the U.S. fleet ballis-
tic missile force as the most survivable element of the U.S.
strategic forces Triad, U.S. strategic planners expressed an
urgent requirement for both short-term and long-term improve-
ments. This need became increasingly vital as the technological
advances by the Soviets and their ICBM/SLBM quantitative
advantages began to signal an erosion of the qualitative edge
enjoyed by the U.S. in the immediate post-SALT I environment
of the early 1970' s. As with most of the Soviet modernization
efforts, U.S. improvements were explicitly authorized by the
Interim Agreement, providing its established ceilings and
dismantlement requirements were not violated.

Near-term modernization was accomplished through
the Poseidon program. Of the existing 41 operational SSBNs
in the FBM force, the ten oldest Polaris submarines were to
remain equipped with the Polaris 2500 NM (A-3) Multiple
Reentry Vehicle (MRV) missiles. The remaining 31 were to be
modified to carry the MIRVed 2500 NM Poseidon (C-3) SLBMs
.
Long-term modernization was to be accomplished
through the Undersea Long-range Missile System (ULMS) , which
eventually emerged as the parallel Trident submarine and
Trident missile programs. Although ULMS was already in the
development stage at the conclusion of SALT I, it was main-
tained that the temporary provisions of the Interim Agreement
would not affect program development. Even under the accel-
erated development called for by Secretary of Defense Laird,
which would have advanced Trident submarine deployment avail-
ability to 1978 (two or three years earlier than previously
proposed in the regular program), the U.S. did not have the
capability of bringing a new Trident SSBN operationally on
line during the 5-year period of the Interim Agreement. Con-
sequently, no significant SALT I impact was anticipated.
These accelerated efforts, however, were attacked by the
Soviets, who asserted that they undermined the 1972 agreements,
despite their own vigorous and questionable modernization
efforts. An example of this Soviet SALT propaganda campaign
is available in comments offered by Genrikh A. Trofimenko,
who claimed that the "acceleration" of such programs as

Trident represented "cardinal" infractions of the spirit of
47SALT I.
As a result of our announced intention to continue
to act in accordance with the terms of the Interim Agreement
beyond its expiration date of 3 October, 1977, SALT I has
affected U.S. FBM force levels. As required by the Interim
Agreement, the U.S. was required to maintain no more than 41
SSBNs and 656 SLBM launchers. A maximum of 44 SSBNs and 710
SLBM launchers could, however, be legally attained if the U.S.
undertook the dismantlement of the 54 Titan II ICBMs . This
option has not been exercised. The only remaining option for
the U.S. therefore, was to ensure that the baseline ceilings
were not violated. As a result of this requirement, and based
on an estimate of the intended sea trials for the first Trident
SSBN, the U.S. Navy initiated the withdrawal of 2 Polaris
SSBNs from the FBM force and began dismantlement procedures
around August 1980. Unfortunately, there was no new Trident
with which to replace them. Production delays not associated
with SALT I currently place this new Trident SSBN 26 months
behind the April 1976 date called for in the initial contract,
and it is not expected to operationally enter the fleet until
March 1982. This has created some problems with respect to
target coverage cohesion. According to Navy officials, the
target responsibilities of the 32 Polaris SLBMs had been
shifted to some of the 1053 U.S. ICBMs. Nevertheless, there
continued to be an adverse effect upon the remaining Polaris

boats which were deployed in the Pacific. As reported in one
recent news account, the time lag created by having to take
them out of service without the Trident replacement has put
4 8
a significant strain on submarine operations in the Pacific.
In spite of these difficulties, it appears that
the remaining boats will be withdrawn from strategic service.
Originally, Polaris boats were to be withdrawn from service
as Trident deployed. However, it has recently been widely
reported that the strategic retirement of all 10 Polaris boats
will be completed by fiscal year 1981. Numerous news accounts
suggest that this retirement has effectively commenced. When
completed, the Polaris retirement will represent a reduction
by about 25% of the Navy's FBM force without an available
replacement.
Several additional factors are pertinent. First,
irrespective of SALT I requirements, the first two Polaris
submarines had exhausted their nuclear fuel. It would there-
fore have required extensive and expensive repair work to
keep them in service. Second, the early decision to initiate
conversion of the remaining 8 Polaris submarines into SSNs
could also be a result of budgetary constraints. Seven out
of the 10 Polaris submarines would have required overhaul
before 1983. It would have cost the Navy between $70 to $90
million per ship to overhaul them and keep them on line. As
the Deputy Director, Strategic Submarine Division, office of
the CNO, states, "The money that we would have to pump into
44

that older weapons system the Navy has found is really not
cost effective when you look at the strategic capability you
49
are getting back." Additionally, the need for maintaining
the Polaris force is significantly reduced once Trident de-
ploys, since one Trident submarine will provide a target
coverage capability greater than that provided by all of the
Polaris SSBNs.
Another factor to consider is the deployment last
year of the first Trident (C-4) equipped Poseidon. With an
increased range of 4,000 NM (1500 nm greater than the C-3)
and a MIRVed capability of 8 warheads, such Trident-equipped
Poseidon SSBNs significantly reduce the disparities associated
with the loss of our Polaris fleet, and 12 Poseidon submarines
have been scheduled for refitting with Tridents by 1982.
The continuation of SALT- I, albeit not legally
binding, will also have a serious long-term implication
affecting Trident's future production rate. As reflected in
Table 2-2, the entire U.S. FBM force, assuming an originally
designed 20-year service life, will be due for retirement
between 1979-1987. Furthermore, all 31 of the newer class
Lafayette SSBNs were commissioned within a 4-year period.
Since the Polaris/Poseidon force was built at a much faster
production rate than that currently planned for Trident, SLBM
force levels will drop significantly during the four year
phase out of Poseidon. Subsequently, Poseidon service life
has been extended to 25 years and then 30, in an effort to
45

minimize the impact of this four year block obsolescence.
These extensions, however, were primarily based upon the
assumption that the U.S. would no longer be restrained by the
temporary constraints imposed by SALT I. Based upon the
Trident procurement rate of 3 submarines every 2 years, SLBM
force levels will surpass the SALT I SLBM launcher ceiling
of 656 upon the commencement of sea trials for the sixth Trident
SSBN. SALT I would therefore require the withdrawal of a
certain percentage of the Poseidon fleet from FBM service, or,
the U.S. must impose an even longer stretch out of the Tridents
already lean production rate. This second alternative would
impose serious budgetary constraints upon a program which has
already experienced the negative effects of cost overruns and
production delays resulting from the Carter Administration's
Trident stretchout. This "good faith" SALT II negotiation
gesture has already significantly affected program cost and
submarine unit costs, resulting from factors such as smaller
lot buys, the flattening of the shipbuilding learning curve,
imposition of additional shipyard overhead expenses per ship
due to a decreased annual shipbuilding rate, and exposure to
increased inflation rates. In summary, U.S. FBM force modern-
ization efforts seem to be adversely affected by an Interim
Agreement which originally had no effect upon strategic U.S.
sea-based development plans, and will continue to be influenced





































































































































































































Another implication of SALT I in respect to poten-
tial naval capabilities arises in respect to the proposed
Shallow Underwater Mobile (SUM) system, which has been recently
suggested as an alternative basing mode for MX. As proposed
by Sidney Drell, SUM would be
a survivable basing mode that relies on
small conventionally powered submarines
operating within several hundred miles
of the East and West coasts of the con-
tinental U.S. Around fifty such
submarines would be deployed in these
coastal waters and would thus be effectively
hidden in an area of more than several
hundred thousand square miles. 5 ^
Notwithstanding the recent debate over SUM's sur-
vivability, which is being contested because of its potential
vulnerability to such factors as the Van Dorn effect, SUM
would be impossible to operationalize if the current SALT I
status quo is maintained. Since "the deployment of modern
SLBM s on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted
against the total level of SLBMs permitted," deployment of
SUMs would have to be at the expense of FBM submarines and
SLBM launchers.
B. SALT II
Although it now seems almost certain that the SALT II
Treaty as signed on 18 June, 1979 will not be brought before
the Senate for ratification, it is nevertheless important
to identify those implications which may have had an impact
upon naval capabilities and strategic sea-based systems.
48

Much like SALT I, the agreements reached in SALT II
embodied a compromise agreement arrangement designed in a
'three tier framework' with each part interdependently linked.
The main body of the accord was integrated into the actual
SALT II Treaty, which fundamentally embraced the agreements
reached at the Vladivostok Summit on November 24, 1974.
This encompasses a complicated arrangement of aggregate limits
upon strategic offensive arms, and upon ratification would
have had a duration until December 31, 1985. The second part
of SALT II takes the form of a Protocol, which adds con-
straints upon the sea- launched and ground- launched variants
of the cruise missile. This particular Protocol would have
expired on December 31, 1981. Finally, the SALT II includes
a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Sub-
sequent Negotiations (SALT III). The entire SALT II accord
is an extremely comprehensive and complex set of documents,
which obviously requires extensive analysis. This study,
however, will be confined to a consolidated analysis of
several key naval issues.
1. SALT II Treaty
The provisions established in the SALT II Treaty could
be characterized as having three fundamental implications
from a naval perspective. These are its effects upon SLBM
and SSBN force levels and modernization, impact of ICBM aggre-




a. Effect upon SLBM and SSBN Force Levels and
Modernization
Article III of the basic SALT II Treaty established
aggregate ceilings for both signatories, which restricted
ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs (Air-
to-surface ballistic missiles) to a combined limit not to
exceed 2,400. This limit was to be further reduced to a maxi-
mum allowable ceiling of 2,250 from January 1, 1981 onwards.
Article V, paragraph 1, further refines these limits by estab-
lishing within the upper limit an aggregate sub-ceiling for
MIRVed ICBMs, SLBMs, ASBMs and cruise missile-capable heavy
bombers, not to exceed 1,320. This is further modified in
paragraph 2, which limits MIRVed ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs to
1,200. Finally, paragraph 3 undertakes to limit ICBMs equipped
with MIRVs to a maximum permissible ceiling of 820.
When these limits are examined in relationship
to the Trident submarine and Trident missile modernization
programs, however, an undesirable production and replacement
problem becomes apparent.
As recorded in the U.S. Statement of Data on the
numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms of 18 June 1979, the U.S.
had in its inventory 550 MIRVed ICBMs for a combined total
of 1046 MIRVed launchers. The impact of these figures be-
comes evident when the planned U.S. strategic forces posture
for the Treaty period is examined. Paul Nitze identified
one major disparity in SALT II Senate testimony which
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indicated, contrary to administration analysis, that SALT II
would have had a negative impact upon planned Trident pro-
duction. Assuming that the past preference for MIRVed ICBMs
remained relatively stable, as implied by the high 820 MIRVed
ICBM launchers sublimit, then the U.S. would continue to rely
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on its existing 550 Minuteman III launchers. Factors such
3
as accuracy, throw-weight potential and C reliability of
present state of the art ICBMs, the termination of the
Minutemen III production line, and delays on the MX all rein-
force this conclusion. The combination of this force with
the 496 MIRVed Poseidon launchers and the projected 168 MIRVed
Trident SSBN launchers would result in a total of 1,214 MIRVed
ICBM launchers. This total exceeds the 1,200 limit on MIRved
missile launchers authorized by SALT II. One could therefore
speculate that, unless there were a further delay in the Tri-
dent program, a small number of Poseidon or Minuteman III
launchers would have to be dismantled. Furthermore, if the
U.S. intended to deploy in excess of 120 ALCM-bombers , an
additional number of Poseidon or Minuteman III launchers would
have to be phased out.
In respect to MIRVed SLBM launchers, the U.S.,
under SALT II, was expected to maintain a quantitative advan-
tage. As projected to 1985, the U.S. would have had 664
MIRVed SLBM launchers on 38 SSBN s . A breakdown of this FBM
force would have primarily consisted of
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• 7 Trident SSBNs, each with 24
Trident I SLBMs, each carrying
approximately 8 RVs
• 12 Poseidon SSBNs backfitted with
16 Trident I SLBMs, each carrying
approximately 8 RVs
• 19 Poseidon SSBNs, each with 16
SLBMs, each carrying 8 to 10 RVs.
In contrast, the Soviets were projected to deploy
only around 380 MIRVed SLBM launchers by 1985. This was based
on the assumption that they would maximize deployment of their
SALT II-authorized MIRVed ICBM limit (820). It is worth
noting, however, that this probable U.S. numerical advantage
in MIRVed SLBM warheads would not offeran SLBM-based hard
target kill capability within the established Treaty period.
Additionally, one must take into consideration a number of
other factors. In relative terms, SALT II provides no fixed
limits on non-MIRVed ballistic missile launchers. The dif-
ference between the 2,250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicle
launcher limit and the 1,200 MIRVed missile sublimit leaves
1,050 launchers which could be either missiles or bombers.
Currently, the U.S. is phasing out all of its ten Polaris
SSBNs, each capable of launching sixteen SLBMs with three MRVs
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has around 792 unMIRVed
SLBM launchers deployed. After reaching the projected 308
MIRVed level, they could still by 1985 have had from 550-650
unMIRVed SLBM launchers. These figures, of course, are only
speculative, and are based on projected estimates of Soviet
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SLBM, ICBM and bomber requirements. As in the Interim Agree-
ment, inconspicuously missing from the SLBM launchers to be
counted under SALT II are the existing SS-N-4 and SS-N-5 SLBMs
deployed aboard the G-I and G-II SSBs. As previously indica-
ted, such launchers could be converted and deployed with
SLBMs capable of a tactical antiship/ASW mission profile, and
would be permitted to utilize advanced MRV or single MaRV
capability under SALT II. This would provide an extremely
useful naval counterforce strike capability, while at the same
time permitting a reserve force of 308 MIRVed SLBMs which
could be withheld for a prolonged engagement or war termination.
This would increase Soviet war fighting capability and offer
an effective bargaining advantage which would enhance war
survivability.
Although the U.S. freedom to develop strategic
forces at sea under SALT II has been maintained; similar free-
dom exists for the Soviets. For example, both the U.S. and
the Soviet Union would be permitted under SALT II to develop
and deploy on SLBMs depressed trajectory technology. Due to
the flatter trajectory offered by a "depressed trajectory"
flight profile, SLBM flight time could be reduced by at least
several minutes. For example, a present high trajectory SLBM
fired from about 500 nm off the U.S. coast could hit an
inland U.S. bomber base in about 8 minutes. U.S. experts
calculate that this flight time could be trimmed to about
five minutes by utilizing a "depressed trajectory" profile.

This would represent an increased danger to the U.S. by en-
hancing Soviet first strike capabilities. The United States,
on the other hand, has little incentive to develop such a
capability for two reasons. First, given present U.S. stra-
tegic doctrine, it is highly unlikely that the U.S. would plan
a first strike attack. Second, geographical asymmetries bene-
fit the Soviets, due to the greater depth of location of
potential Soviet soft targets. The U.S. SALT II delegation
headed by Paul Warnke offered a proposal on prohibiting such
"depressed trajectory" development in 1978; but it was reported
that if the Soviets balked at the proposed ban, the U.S. did
not consider it significant enough to stand in the way of
final agreement,
b. ICBMs
One of the most striking asymmetries in strategic
capabilities in the present treaty is in ICBMs. In MIRVed
ICBM launchers, the U.S. at treaty signature had 550 Minute-
man III ICBMs as opposed to 556 for the Soviets. At first
glance, one could probably conclude that this roughly equates
to parity. However, the Soviet ICBM force, both MIRVed and
unMIRVed, constitutes far greater throwweight and hard-target
kill potential than that offered by the U.S. land-based bal-
listic missile force. The implications of Soviet throwweight
advantage are particularly acute in light of the 308 MIRVed
SS-18 heavy ICBMs permitted in SALT II. Calculations of SS-
18 hard-target kill capability, assuming a .75 megaton warhead

and an expected
. 1 nautical mile CEP, would permit about one-
third of this force to destroy some ninety percent of the
entire U.S. ICBM force. In comparison to the quantitative
advantages the U.S. is expected to enjoy with respect to MIRVed
SLBM warheads, sixty SS-18s (roughly 201 of the force), would
exceed the total U.S. SLBM megatonnage projected for 1985
(inclusive of seven Trident I equipped Ohio-class SSBNs and
ten Trident I converted Poseidon SSBNs). 54 Similar sized
ICBMs are not authorized for the U.S. under SALT II. One
could approximate from the existing (and often disparate)
data available which take into account such factors as throw-
weight, warheads, accuracy, hard-target kill capabilities,
active and passive defenses, and the number and dispersion
of targets, that SALT II grants rather significant advantages
to the Soviet Union in the present and potential overall
effective strategic balance. In the context of a Soviet stra-
tegic doctrine of warfighting, which stresses that victory
in a nuclear war is feasible and meaningful, the asymmetry
briefly outlined above provides the Soviets an opportunity to
undertake programs which would further enhance these objectives.
To recapitulate, this could translate into the development
and tactical deployment of Soviet ICBMs, MRBMs and IRBMs ded-
icated to a counterforce antishipping and ASW mission,
c. Naval ALCMs
A highly promising technological development was




although it has undergone most of its flight
tests from a tactical aircraft (a Navy A-6 carrier-based attack
•aircraft). Article VIII of the SALT II Treaty specifies that
1. Each Party undertakes not to flight
test cruise missiles capable of a range
in excess of 600 kilometers or ASBMs from
aircraft other than bombers or to convert
such aircraft into aircraft equipped for
such missiles.
2. Each Party undertakes not to con-
vert aircraft other than bombers into
aircraft which can carry out the mission
of a heavy bomber as referred to in sub-
paragraph 3 (b) of Article II. 55
However, a requirement continues to exist, for
such a capability, since the Navy's carriers remain primary
targets of and are presently highly vulnerable to coordinated
counterforce strikes from Soviet air, surface and sub-surface
platforms. The deployment of long-range ALCMs on carrier-
based tactical aircraft would enhance the carriers offensive
projection capability by extending the carrier's effective
launch and strike radius and provide greater penetrability
for its conventional and nuclear land-attack capability.
Long-range land attack cruise missiles could also "reduce
aircraft attrition in attacks against heavily armed targets,
permit heavier initial attacks, and lead to achievement of
air superiority earlier." Additionally, with an extended
range capability, the carrier would enjoy a stand-off capa-
bility, thereby reducing the time in or need for entering
a highly reactive Soviet naval defensive envelope. SALT-II
therefore has eliminated an extremely effective option for
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increasing the U.S. Navy's sea control and power projection
capabilities in this area. In contrast, the shorter ranges
permitted by this provision provide the Soviet sea-based and
land-based naval aircraft an attractive antiship weapon system.
Thus, while constraining the missions and survivability of
U.S. carriers, SALT II enhances the sea denial and damage
limitation missions of the Soviet Navy,
d. Backfire
These contrasting effects become even more acute
when one considers the naval implications of the SALT II Back-
fire bomber exclusion. Notwithstanding its arguable inter-
continental range capabilities, there is virtually no debate
over the potential threat to U.S. naval forces in respect to
supersonic Backfire bombers equipped with short range (less
than 600 km) ALCMs in a naval environment. Backfires, and to
a lesser degree the remaining medium bombers assigned to the
Soviet Naval Air Force, will be able to attack U.S. carriers
and ships with air-to-surface missiles at extended distances
from their home bases, covering most sea areas of high U.S.
naval interest. They can launch cruise missiles from beyond
the range of our naval Anti-air Warfare (AAW) perimeter, ex-
tend the effective concentration of coordinated Soviet air,
surface, and submarine attack, and use new technology to find
our fleet units, jam our defenses, and screen their approach.
As Uwe Nerlich notes, it is difficult to comprehend, from a
negotiation perspective, why the present administration has

virtually abandoned the SM-2 nuclear warhead "at the very
moment the United States failed to constrain Backfire deploy-
ment in SALT II, even though the SM-2 was designed to protect
sea lanes against the Backfire." 57 Finally, the Backfire
demonstrates a range capability for bomber strikes on air-
fields currently utilized by the U.S. Navy's P-3 landbased
ASW aircraft. Such strikes could include Keflavik, Lajes,
Rota and Sigonella in the Atlantic/Mediterranean regions and
virtually all of the P-3 deployment sites in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans. This would significantly disable an extremely
effective and important ASW asset.
2. SALT II Protocol
a. Effect Upon SLCM
The SALT II Protocol was primarily designed as a
supplement to the SALT II Treaty and was intended to encompass
those issues on which 'permanent' agreement could not be
reached, or where uncertainty existed in respect to the
evolutionary development of new military technology.
Of major consequences are the Protocol's provisions
pertaining to the sea-launched cruise missile. Specifically,
"each Party undertakes not to deploy cruise missiles capable
of a range in excess of 600 kilometers on sea-based launchers
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or on land-based launchers." Furthermore, it was agreed
that application of the range limitation would be calculated
utilizing an 'odometer' rather than 'operational' range cri-
terion for the measurement of a cruise missile's maximum range.

The U.S. 'operational' range concept took into
account the evasive route a cruise missile must take to avoid
active defenses and to locate areas of substantial terrain
contrast to update its terrain contour matching system (TERCOM)
The Soviet 'odometer' concept, which prevailed in SALT II
SLCM and GLCM range determination, effectively reduces the
operating range by 20 to 40 percent depending upon the density
of air defense and the character of local terrain.
This fundamentally limits the application of U.S.
sea-launched cruise missiles to an anti-shipping role or
limited shore strike, but even more severely constrains their
utilization in a strategic land-attack mission. Several
strategic targeting asymmetries explain this limiting aspect.
The most salient SLCM targeting asymmetry results
from geographical differences. The 600 km range restriction
significantly favors a Soviet counterforce and countervalue
advantage for SLCM targeting. For example, the existing SS-N-3
Shaddock cruise missiles launched from E-II class submarines
off the U.S. coast could inflict significant damage to these
important regions. Counterforce targets within range of a
600 km SLCM include: FBM submarine ports, SLBM missile stor-
age areas, bomber bases within range of the coast, naval bases
and airfields, C installations and the U.S. National Command
Authority. The only major counterforce targets these SLCMs
would not be capable of striking would be ICBM silos and bomber
bases which are sufficiently deployed inland from the coast.
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Additionally, U.S. nuclear systems in Europe and Asia are vul-
nerable to short-range cruise missile attack from Soviet
surface- launched, submarine- launched and air-launched platforms,
such as the KYNDA cruiser, E-II or Juliet submarines, or
Backfire bomber. U.S. countervalue vulnerability to 600 km
SLCMs has been estimated to be from 50 to 75 percent of our
population and industry.
In contrast, the unique characteristics of the
Soviet Union's geography makes the U.S. SLCM cruise missile
targeting problem more complex. First, short-range SLCM
limitations make U.S. launch platforms highly vulnerable to
Soviet coastal ASW efforts and extended Soviet air defenses.
Additionally, the Soviet deployment of anti-shipping SLCMs
and ALCMs further erode the survivability of surface cruise
missile carriers by extending the Soviet defensive perimeter.
For example, SLCM-equipped Soviet surface combatants could be
deployed athwart the North Cape, thereby inducing substantial
target coverage degradation for shortrange SLCM units.
U.S. sea-based requirements for a land-attack
SLCM require a range sufficient enough to strike Soviet counter-
force targets from distant launch buffer zones, thereby en-
hancing cruise missile carrier survivability and maintaining
the strategic or tactical formidability of the SLCM. As a
subset to the primary Navy mission, the function of sea con-
trol includes the destruction of selected naval targets
ashore. Darold Axtman notes however, that Soviet coastal

counterforce targets are for the most part nearly lOOOnm from
safe launching zones, assuming a reasonably secure launch
position of 200nm from the coast. There are a limited number
of counterforce targets which are within a range less than
lOOOnm which include the Northern and Pacific Fleet naval
installations and some early warning facilities. 62 It could
be argued, however, that a 200nm safety launch zone in the
Barents Sea area is an overly optimistic assumption, in view
of the heavy concentration of Soviet naval and air units in
this region.
Finally, most Soviet countervalue targets are
located at ranges from 1000-2000nm from a 200nm buffer launch
zone. A basic comparison of the geographic asymmetries in
respect to effective SLCM ranges is illustrated in charts
2-1 and 2-2.
Salt II Treaty advocates have maintained that
these limitations are only effective until the Protocol's
expiration date on December 31, 1981, and that the Protocol
does not constrain future deployment, since the operational
IOC for the SLCM is not anticipated until sometime after this
date. These arguments, however, have received a number of
critical appraisals. William Schneider's analysis notes that
under the Vladivostok Accords, the defense program proposed
by President Ford in the FY 1977 and FY 1978 Budgets, the
Protocol's original duration (through December 31, 1980)
would not have interfered with the cruise missile program.
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However, the extension of the Protocol under the Carter Admin-
istration into December of FY 82 would have interfered with
the deployment of the SLCM. Consequently, the Carter Adminis-
tration superficially resolved the issue by slowing down the
development of the SLCM in the FY 78 and 79 DoD budgets, which
effectively delayed SLCM availability until FY 84 or later.
This go-slow attitude by the Carter Administration in respect
to the land- attack SLCM has been identified in several addi-
tional sources. As reported in a January 1977 issue of the
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report
,
Secretary Brown reportedly was considering
cancellation of the long-range, ship-
launched version of the cruise missile-a
miniature jet-powered drone that could
deliver a nuclear warhead to within tens
of yards of a target more than 2,000
miles distant. Both he and Gen. Brown
told the Senate Committee Jan. 25, that
they regarded this version of the weapon
as much less useful than tactical and
air-launched versions. °4
In both 1978 and in 1979, records of Sentate Armed
Services Committee action attest to an administration policy
of budgetary restraint on the land-attack SLCM.
As it had done in 1978, the panel in-
sisted on adding money (19.4 million)
for production of nuclear-armed cruise
missiles that would be launched from
ships and submarines against land tar-
gets. The administration had deferred
production of the weapon, arguing that
it might simply duplicate other weapons.
But committee members argued that the
weapon could offset a Soviet advantage
in long-range nuclear arms deployed in
Europe and they charged the Administra-











Finally, as reported in the Washington Post in August 1980,
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had told the Navy, after
reviewing the Navy's budget plans for FY 1982 and beyond, to
move the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear or TLAM/N down
a notch in budget planning. "Under Brown's newest timetable,
part of this weapon would not go into production until 1983,
if then." Although positive linkages between this decision
and Salt II have not been established, a possibility does
exist that Salt II was an important factor.
Verification poses an additional problem. First,
cruise missile testing, unlike ICBMs or SLBMs, can be easily
concealed. For example, cruise missile performance charac-
teristics, such as speed, range, endurance, and other charac-
teristics, could be measured in wind tunnels; or on aircraft
wing-pylons. Verification is compounded further because it
is difficult to determine a cruise missile's range-payload
tradeoff without such performance data and payload/fuel cap-
acities. To illustrate this problem, A. A. Tinajero notes:
a cruise missile armed with a high explosive
warhead and range of 600 kilometers or less
could be modified internally to carry a
smaller and lighter nuclear warhead to
significantly greater ranges by trading
off payload weight and volume for fuel,
and be indistinguishable as to purpose.
Such is the case with the Soviet SS-N-3
SHADDOCKS, whose estimated effective
range is about 150 nautical miles, but
reportedly could triple that range without
visible external changes. 67
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An outgrowth of such verification problems are probable asym-
metries in observance of the Protocol's limits on SLCMs . The
U.S. may impose unilateral constraints to assure domestic
critics that we are not in violation, whereas the Soviets
need not worry about internal domestic debate on such issues.
3. Joint Statement of Principles
a. Issue of Precedence
One final dimension of SALT II with serious impli-
cations for the future of the SLCM pertains to the preceden-
tial value of the Protocol. The Administration has emphasized
its view that the U.S. is under no obligation to abide by or
extend the Protocol beyond December 31, 1981. However,
Principle Three, paragraph 3, of the Joint Statement of
Principles states that the Parties shall pursue in the course
of subsequent negotiations "resolution of the issue included
f\ ft
in the Protocol to the Treaty..." General Rowny's inter-
pretation contrasts significantly with that of the Administra-
tion. He states "I think that the protocol's only purpose is
to set a precedent. Otherwise, why would there be a protocol
at all? Why would the Soviets insist that there be a protocol?
My logic on that is very simple. If the Protocol is not to
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be a precedent, and we say that, then let's not have one."
William Van Cleave had similar misgivings, and notes "even
though these limitations are in the Protocol and will pre-
sumably expire after 1981, the principle is established and
the precedent set. In both a political and negotiating sense,
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this seems to me to be a serious setback," 70 The Soviets have
insisted that the provisions included in the Protocol were
intended as an initial temporary restraint, and that these
issues were to be the first thing on the agenda during the
negotiations in SALT III. This places U.S. SALT III negotia-
tors at an immediate disadvantage, since the agenda formula-
tion process could be a critical factor in the negotiated
outcome. SLCMs therefore, immediately becomes subject to
the strictures of SALT III, where the Soviets would hold a
tactical negotiation advantage in respect to the precedential
value of the Protocol, thereby placing U.S. negotiators on
the defensive during the next round of SALT.
C. SUMMARY
One can conclude from the observations presented in this
chapter that there appear to be both functional and inter-
pretive asymmetries within the context of both SALT I and
SALT II outcomes. SALT seems to have been an important factor
affecting a number of significant aspects of the U.S. naval
force structure. For example, as indicated in this analysis,
the ABM Treaty prohibits the development of a sea-based ABM;
however, a noticeable disparity exists which places the U.S.
Navy at a potential disadvantage if one takes the potential
Soviet anti-shipping threat of tactical ballistic missiles
(both land-based and sea-based) seriously. The 1972 Interim
Agreement gave the Soviets a significant numerical margin in
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both SSBNs and SLBMs , and both SALT I and SALT II have given
the Soviets an important advantage in ICBM throwweight. Taken
in the aggregate, such advantages increase the potential
availability and attractiveness of deploying ICBMs or SLBMs
in a tactical mode directed against U.S. naval forces at sea.
The Backfire bomber exclusion permits the expansion of
offensive Soviet-naval aviation to continue without hinderance,
assuming that the 30-unit-per year limit conforms to Soviet '
planning. Finally, the SALT II Protocol, taken in context
of the Joint Statement of Principles, could potentially prevent
realization of the American SLCM program, while at the same
time exempting Soviet SLCMs which are already deployed. On
balance, these affects could potentially constrain the ability
of the U.S. Navy to expand its sea control and power projection
mission effectiveness. In contrast, these outcomes appear
to enhance the Soviet Navy's momentum for superiority in all
phases of naval warfare, thereby increasing the Soviet naval
threat in both nuclear and non-nuclear warfare. Although
naval force structures are affected by a number of different
factors, the following chapter will primarily examine asym-
metries in U.S. and Soviet SALT negotiating approaches, which




III. NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF KEY TREATY OUTCOMES
In order to test the hypothesis presented in this study,
it is necessary to examine the negotiating history of the
SALT Treaty outcomes, in an effort to determine the rela-
tionship between negotiation behavior and the resultant
SALT outcomes. Pursuit of this objective, however, is
somewhat constrained by the limited availability of public
data in respect to the actual SALT negotiations and its
organizational mechanisms, particularly in respect to the
Soviet Union. As Thomas Wolfe indicates,
How the SALT process actually operates
in the Soviet Union is sketchily known,
and the same is true of the internal
organizational arrangements for hand-
ling it. This paucity of information
in the case of SALT parallels the poor
state of knowledge on the inner work-
ings of the Soviet decisionmaking sys-
tem in general, and in particular on
the mechanisms for integrating military
policy with political and economic
considerations . 1
Additionally, there is no body of informed public opinion
on SALT in the Soviet Union. Thus, analysis of SALT must
concentrate on information gleaned strictly from non-Soviet
analysts, such as John Newhouse, Thomas Wolfe, and Paul
Nitze. Nevertheless, evidence gathered on the basis of this
available information should be sufficient to draw tentative
conclusions about any causative linkages between negotiating
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asymmetries and the outcomes examined in the previous chapter.
This chapter will primarily focus on two key areas of analysis
First, the U.S. SALT negotiating approach will be examined.
This includes analysis of U.S. SALT organizational and con-
trol mechanisms, the effect of the "back channel" negotiations
and summit bargaining upon the outcomes in question, and the
impact of the negotiations within the U.S. Government.
Second, Soviet negotiating style will be examined in compari-
son with that of the U.S., thereby identifying relevant nego-
tiating asymmetries between the two approaches. It must be
recognized at the outset, however, that a variety of addi-
tional factors, such as defense spending, inter-service
bureaucratic competition etc. are all factors that have an
influence upon the naval implications identified in the
previous chapter. The purpose in this chapter is to demon-
strate that the U.S. negotiating approach in SALT was one
of these factors, and that it has had an important affect
upon the overall U.S. naval force structure.
A. U.S. NEGOTIATING APPROACH
In the first of his foreign policy addresses to Congress,
President Richard M. Nixon identified what he envisioned to
be the fundamental prerequisites of a realistic national
security policy. In his view, U.S. foreign policy for the
1970 's, and the structure of durable peace, would depend
upon three distinct components. Partnership and strength

were the first two elements, and negotiation constituted the
third. Nixon stated that "our commitment to peace is most
convincingly demonstrated in our willingness to negotiate
our points of difference in an fair and business-like manner
with the Communist countries." Three months earlier, the
cornerstone of this principle of negotiation had been poised
when the United States and the Soviet Union entered into
talks on the limitation of strategic arms.
The U.S. concept of equitable and accommodative negotia-
tion characterized our approach to SALT and is, as K. J.
Holsti points out, rooted in the traditional Western style
of negotiation. These Western assumptions include confi-
dence that "any agreement can be reached through compro-
mise;" trust that "expressions of good will toward the
opponent, as well as frankness and candor in discussions,
will produce an atmosphere conducive to compromise;" pre-
ference for "compromise and subsequent reconciliation" as
opposed to "total victory and vindictiveness ; " belief in
negotiation as a means of achieving agreement rather than
of prolonging conflict; and emphasis on a willingness to
compromise, desire for fairness, sincerity, honesty, good
will, and cooperation."
Henry Kissinger, explains that there is a tendency on
the part of the United States to "believe that peace and
stability are 'natural'." Crises, on the otherhand, are
perceived as unnatural abberations "caused by personal

ill-will rather than by objective conditions." Kissinger
adds that, "if tension persists, it is because Communist
leaders continue to be unreasonable; it can be allievated
by establishing an atmosphere of trust and good personal
relations or by a change of heart on the part of the Soviets." 4
An immediate result of this conceptualization is that U.S.
policy toward the Soviet Union has fluctuated between two
dichotomous approaches. As Kissinger explains,
During periods of tension the United States
tends to assume that Soviet policy is con-
ducted by highly purposeful ideologically
inspired men operating according to care-
ful, long-range plans. During periods of
detente, American leaders have often acted
as if a settlement could be achieved by
good personal relations with their Com-
munist counterparts. Either approach
leads to an avoidance of concreteness
.
When the Soviets are aggressive, negotia-
tions are believed to be useless, and when
they are conciliatory; there is a reluc-
5tance to disturb the favorable atmosphere.
From the negotiation perspective, it has been generally
maintained that the negotiating styles which are adopted by
nations generally tend to represent "recurrent behavioral
phenomena which are relatively independent of specific
issue content or the idiosyncratic characteristics of indi-
vidual diplomats." Although negotiation strategy is also
a function of such factors as a government's strategic
assessment, it is nonetheless, as former American Ambassador
Arthur H. Dean stresses, "a kind of national signature,
reflecting not only official policies, but also characteristics
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of the society from which the diplomat comes and the outlook
7
in which he has been bred." Most significantly, the particu-
lar negotiation methods employed by a nation "influences
heavily the reactions of a particular diplomat and the pro-
cedures he will be likely to follow." 8
An additional trait in the methodological pattern of nego-
tiation was identified by the British diplomat Sir Harold
Nicolson, who noted that "all diplomatists (the pro fessionals
scarcely less than the amateurs) are inclined to assume
(erroneously) that their own conception of the art of nego-
tiation is shared more or less by those foreigners with whom
gthey are negotiating." As Louis J. Samelson remarks, such
mirror imaging frequently ob scures from Western negotiators
the significance of variation in negotiation behavior.
Therefore, a "failure to perceive divergencies in method
and approach can lead to serious difficulties in achieving
an effective resolution of outstanding conflicts."
In his assessment of SALT, William Van Cleave believes
that the U.S. approach to negotiation has essentially been
unable to integrate and utilize negotiation as an effective
instrument of a broad and coherent strategic policy. As he
indicates, the underlying cause of this failure stems from
the aforementioned assumptions, which have been inherently
adapted by the U.S.:
Driven by an assumption that arms control
negotiations are uniquely a cooperative
process, wherein compromise is a mutual
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objective and negotiation a non-zero sum
game affording both sides equal advantages,
the United States has found it difficult
to view arms control negotiations in
terms of political competition, as a
struggle for advantage, or as a means of
achieving or supporting other foreign




This U.S. approach to SALT therefore assumes that both
sides share a common perception of the objectives and urgencies
at hand. U.S. goals have included the recognition of and the
need to preserve parity, mutual deterrence and strategic
stability. As Garthoff comments,
The two governments agreed explicity
that a main objective of the talks
would be to achieve and to maintain
stable strategic deterrence between
the United States and the Soviet Union
through agreed limitations on the de-
ployment of strategic offensive and
defensive arms. They agreed implic-
itly that strategic parity should be
accepted and maintained, and more
specifically that the limitations
would be balanced so that neither
side could obtain any military advan-
tage, and equal security would be
assured for both sides. 12
Strongly influencing SALT was also the concept of stra-
tegic parity. The significance of this conceptual principle
was clearly demonstrated by the hesitancy with which the
Soviets originally approached SALT in respect to establishing
a firm commitment for beginning negotiation. When the
Johnson Administration first initiated its exploratory probes
with the Soviets in an effort to examine the possibility of
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establishing what was later to become SALT, the Soviets were
clearly behind the U.S. in strategic strength. As Garthoff
indicates,
One reason for the delay was the disparity
in strategic strength at the time SALT was
proposed. In 1967, the strategic force
levels of the Soviet Union were consider-
ably inferior to those of the United States
and the Russians agreed to begin the talks
only when they were in reach of numerical ,
,
parity in strategic intercontinental systems...
Thus, although SALT was highly publicized in the U.S.,
"the momentum gathering behind the talks was deceptive" and
that "it was generated in Washington, not Moscow." The
Soviets, highly suspicious of U.S. motivations, therefore,
approached SALT with responsive caution. It was not until
mid-1968 that the Soviets considered themselves sufficiently
close to strategic parity with the United States. The issue
of parity therefore became a key mechanism is formulating
the SALT neogtiation process. In the American view, SALT
was, as Newhouse remarked, based upon a mutual need to solem
nize this principle, according to which "each assumes the
other is negotiating because parity has been achieved."
It can be argued, however, that the principle of parity
could also have been linked to Soviet negotiating strategy,
thereby having an influence on the SALT outcomes. Louis
Karrass in his broad study of the relationship of negotiator




Bargaining outcome was found to be a
direct function of negotiator ability
where the power balance between adver-
saries was approximately equal. In
addition, the greater the difference in
ability between the opposing negotiators,
the more favorable was the outcome for
the high trait score negotiator. °
Although this particular study did not specifically
address SALT in its analysis, there are nevertheless some
important parallels. If, as Newhouse and others contend,
SALT began under the condition of relative parity, then it
would stand to reason that its outcomes would be dependent
upon the relationship which existed between the negotiating
approaches of the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
1. U.S. Strategic Concept in SALT Years
Parity, as seen from the U.S., suited the U.S. stra-
tegic philosophy of mutual deterrence, since it conceded to
both sides a capability to inflict massive retaliatory punish-
ment on the countervalue targets of an attacking opponent.
The U.S. therefore, approached SALT with a willingness to
accept mutual assured destruction (MAD) , which, as perceived
by the U.S., offered the best assurance of strategic stability
As Wolfe indicates, this U.S. concept of deterrence was also
rooted
in the proposition that nuclear war would
be unwinnable in any meaningful political
sense. Although amended criteria for stra-
tegic force size and design began to be
advanced in 1974 after James R. Schlesinger
became Secretary of Defense. . . it seems
fair to say that throughout SALT I and at
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least the first part of SALT II the mutual
assured destruction concept formed the
central axis of consensus for the making
of major strategic posture and arms con-
trol decisions in the United States. 17
Mutual assured destruction therefore became the backbone
of the U.S. strategic doctrine which predominantly prevailed
during SALT, thereby significantly influencing not only U.S.
arms control policy, but also force planning, operational
strategies, weapons choice, and R § D. SALT became an in-
strument by which the U.S. could guarantee MAD at the lowest
level of arms effort possible. Under the Nixon Administra-
tion, this doctrine translated into a defense planning
approach known as sufficiency.
It needs to be understood with total
clarity.... that defense programs are
not infinitely adjustable... there is
an absolute point below which our se-
curity forces must never be allowed to
go. That is the level of sufficiency.
Above or at that level our defense
forces protect national security
adequately. Below that level is one
vast undifferentiated area of no se-
curity at all. For it serves no pur-
pose in conflicts between nations to
have been almost strong enough.
Characteristic of this U.S. approach to SALT are the out-
comes prohibiting extensive anti-ballistic missile deployment
and the negotiated asymmetries in respect to SSBN and SLBM
launcher levels. As Newhouse indicates, the overriding con-
cern of the U.S. during SALT I was constraining Soviet ABM
deployment and the potential threat of heavy land-based
Soviet missiles to our Minuteman force. Therefore, all of

the U.S. neogtiation options had been shaped to constrain
this threat, thereby ensuring the enhancement of MAD. For
example, the unidirectional "freedom to mix" which emerged in
the SALT I outcome was primarily designed by the U.S. to
encourage the Soviets to substitute smaller and less accurate
sea-based missiles for the heavier and MAD-destabilizing land-
based systems, like the Soviet SS-9 ICBM. 29 In other words,
the U.S. was attempting to diffuse Soviet first strike capa-
bility by channeling their strategic efforts out to sea,
where the smaller, less accurate, yet more survivable sea-
based SLBMs would continue to reinforce U.S. MAD- influenced
policies. This approach to SALT, however, was highly depend-
ent upon mutuality in strategic doctrine. As will be discussed
later, this was not the case. Soviet strategic philosophy
contrasted sharply with that of the U.S. and strongly in-
fluenced the Soviet approach to SALT, which was highly diver-
gent from that of the U.S.
2 . U.S.. Organizational and Control Mechanisms
The organizational and control aspects of SALT which
emerged in the U.S. reflect significant variations in time,
and have evolved through three distinct phases. The SALT
apparatus which was produced under the Johnson Administration
could be characterized as a consensus-building arrangement,
with the White House essentially divorced from the internal
bargaining process. As Newhouse remarks,
7fi

Neither Johnson nor his staff would take
part in bureaucracy's epic struggle to
produce not just a "simple, clear pro-
posal," but one that would actually make
a serious matters of SALT. In Johnson's
day, there was no Henry Kissinger to
hold the bureaucracy in line and force
up Presidential options, as distinct
from the preferences of the various
parts of the government
.
™
Furthermore, the key behind the bureaucracy's accept-
ance of any SALT agreement was significantly dependent upon
approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Newhouse concludes,
"Unlike Nixon, Johnson - as everyone in government knew -
wanted agreement, not options. This meant that the Joint
21Chiefs had to be on board."
As events unfolded, however, a major shift in this
SALT apparatus would take place prior to negotiation. The
Soviet invasion of Czecholovakia in 1968 acted as a braking
mechanism, albeit temporarily, of the SALT momemtum which
had developed. Additionally, as a result of the November
elections, Johnson's Administration found itself in a lame-
duck transition. The SALT organizational and control
machinery which subsequently materialized under the incoming
Nixon Administration evolved into one of highly centralized
White House control. As Thomas Wolfe writes, this new
apparatus
was shaped so as to make it fully re-
sponsive to centralized White House
direction within the National Security
Council (NSC) system... The new struc-
ture would also provide the instruments
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for exercising close White House control
over the negotiating aspects of the SALT
process as well. 2 ^
The control of this new SALT organization lay in the
establishment of the Verification Panel, which Kissinger
chaired and created in July 1969. The rationale behind such
a centralized system was to establish a process which would
minimize the time lag in policy formulation which was so
characteristic 'of the previous bureaucratic process of consen-
sus building. This centralized arrangement "virtually eli-
minated the narrow adversary approach to arms limitation
hitherto practiced within the U.S. government, which used to
provoke bitter intramural controversies leading to stultified
23international negotiations." This institutional center of
power for SALT matters functioned, with only minor altera-
tions, throughout the Nixon and Ford Administrations.
As the negotiations for SALT I got underway, the
Nixon-Kissinger team felt quite confident that if the Soviets
weren't amenable to the optional proposals created by their
White House-centered system, cooperative changes could be
quickly made without seeing matters deadlocked by long inter-
nal bureaucratic bargaining. As Newhouse remarks, the flex-
ibility offered by such a system undoubtedly has its advantages
However, consistency and patience are also extremely useful
tools in negotiation, and the U.S. approach to negotiation,
particularly in SALT I, failed in many instances to utilize
or fully appreciate the value of these last two negotiation
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techniques. U.S. proposals would be rejected outright by the
Soviets. In turn, the U.S. would withdraw its option and
offer a new proposal in quick succession. As Newhouse remarks,
"opinion divides on whether the White House should have offered
the Soviets so many proposals in so short a time. When two
negotiating parties are far apart, they normally hold for some
time to fixed positions, inching but slowly toward each other
24
and the eventual agreement or failure to agree." The U.S.
response to traditional and normal Soviet caution was to
break the tedium which the Soviet approach harbored by esta-
blishing a fast pace of successive offers. However,
People accustomed to dealing with the
Russians worried that Washington's
flexibility might confuse them, or
tempt them, or end by doing both.
Confusion breeds suspicion, and sus-
picion softens nobody's negotiating
position. Alternatively, Moscow
might have mistakenly assumed that
Washington's interest in a SALT
agreement exceeded its own and, if
properly exploited, might return
numerous concessions. 2 ^
Although the tight centralized control of SALT in the
White House did shorten reaction time in Washington, the
decision-making process in Moscow was still a lengthy and un-
wieldy process. Additionally, the bureaucratic role in SALT
of the Soviet military was more acute than that of its U.S.
counterpart.
Garthoff argues that the U.S. negotiation tactic of
taking initiative was advantageous because the U.S. thereby

had an opportunity to maneuver into position first. Addition-
ally, given the inflexibility of the Soviet negotiators and
the constraining effect of the Soviet bureaucracy, the U.S.
approach offered the negotiating latitude necessary toward
finding an agreed negotiating position.
On the other hand, such an approach creates the risk
of auto-negotiation. U. Alexis Johnson, who took over as
head of the U.S. SALT delegation in early 1973, outlined the
perplexities of negotiating in such a manner. As he reportedly
explained,
Each time the Soviets would reject an
American proposal the American nego-
tiators would revise it in order to
make the proposal more acceptable and
then resubmit it. The Soviets may
reject the revision in which case the
Americans would confer on further
revisions. And so forth.
^
7
As he further noted, the danger with such a negotiation posi-
tion was that, if not careful, the U.S. would in time be
negotiating with itself. Newhouse also makes reference to
the quandary effects of Soviet inflexibility, by noting that
"the effect was to reinforce a suspicion among the Americans
2 8
that it was they who were negotiating with themselves."
He continues by citing the thoughts of a "vexed American
official" who remarked,
We have tabled three proposals in minute
detail. They complain bitterly about the
degree of detail, yet they've learned a
great deal about our programs. They've
told us nothing. All we've gotten in
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return is general statements and whatever
they want in the way of agreement is sup-
posed to be based on our acceptance of
these general statements. The bulk of
this negotiation is not bilateral but
internal. We make presentations. They
complain, because by objecting to the
wealth of detail they get more of it.
They'll say for example. "We do not
understand the following point." That
obliges us to get into even more detail.
Let's face it. They are learning a lot,
but nothing else is happening. 29
The Soviets therefore went into the SALT negotiations
with an "intelligence" advantage, given their excellent oppor-
tunity for gaining good knowledge of U.S. defense programs
and weapon systems through additional channels of information
These sources are wide and varied. Such items in the U.S.
are highly scrutinized publicly, where options are thrashed
out in the open. The presence of Soviet embassy personnel
at defense hearings in Congress demonstrates that the Soviets
exercise this opportunity. Additional sources include rela-
tive easy access to unclassified government documents and
publications, data in technical journals, and articles
written by academic scholars and research institutes. The
U.S., on the other hand, has extremely poor knowledge of
Soviet decision-making and force program objectives, and
that which is known is largely tentative and based upon
educated guesswork. As Van Cleave argues, this asymmetry
in knolwedge has both political and military advantages for
the Soviets. "Soviet defense programs must be divined on
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the basis of intelligence guesswork predicated upon incomplete
information." The information gap presented by this asymmetry
can lead to underestimating projected Soviet capabilities:
Our projections of the Soviet build-up
over the past several years regularly
had it leveling off and stopping at
far lower levels than were actually
attained. The premise of our prepara-
tions for SALT I was that the Soviets
by 1969 had attained an acceptable
strategic balance with the United
States and were willing to freeze
that balance. *"
Additionally this asymmetry raises the risk of tech-
nological surprise and shortens the lead time necessary to
develop and deploy effective countermeasures.
Coupled with the amorphous tenets of an
assured destruction strategic philosophy
on the U.S. side, it encourages ration-
alization regarding the significance of
events that had been unanticipated. And
coupled with a lingering, often smug
belief in the existence and indefinite
continuation of U.S. technology super-
iority, it fosters an unwarranted dis-
dain toward both actual and possible
Soviet accomplishments . 31
The effect of this asymmetry is clearly reflected in
the final SALT I outcome establishing numerical limits on
SSBN and SLBM launcher levels. As previously mentioned, the
U.S. had no precise calculation of Soviet SSBN numbers with
which to establish the negotiated baseline figures. In May
1972, U.S. intelligence estimates varied, but generally con-
cluded that the Soviets had between 41 and 43 SSBN s . However,
in Helsinki, the Soviets abruptly laid claim to precisely 48

SSBNs. This was 5 to 7 more than had been estimated by the
U.S. As Newhouse noted, "to accept the Russians' count also
meant accepting that they were that much closer to the magic
numbers 62 and 950 and would not be obliged to replace nearly
as many old weapons in reaching these totals. American tech-
nicians called this the free ride issue." 32 Kissinger himself
admits that he and his staff had no concrete evidence to work
with in this respect. Therefore, he and his staff conveniently
side stepped the issue. As he remarked,
In order to avoid the impossible numbers
game of agreeing on how many submarines
the Soviets actually had, the highly
esoteric debates about, what constituted
a submarine actually "under construction,"
and the dispute over how many were in the
D-class and Y-class, my staff and I had
worked out a different approach. ^3
Soviet concealment and deception activity in their
submarine shipyard construction facilities did not improve
the situation. For example, since 1966, the Soviets were
reported to have built decoy submarines in an attempt to
confuse U.S. intelligence. In 1970, the Soviets began con-
struction of three tunnels at naval bases to deny information
on submarine readiness status. Such activity continued after
SALT I, and increased substantially in 1974, when the U.S.
detected broad efforts by the Soviets to conceal their
mobile missile program, the production of ICBMs, and the
construction of SSBNs. In this latter case, concealment
involved the placing of large canvas cover's over missile




3. The U.S. Military's Role in SALT
The last phase of the U.S. organizational machinery
for dealing with SALT emerged in January 1977, under the
Carter Administration, and reflected a shift back to the
diffused bureaucratic style which typified SALT policy making
under the Johnson Administration. The tightly centralized
control of SALT was therefore redistributed to a broader base
of policymaking influence and authority. However, the leading
players in this new arrangement were all civilian policy-
makers. Principally the Secretary of State, Secretary of
Defense, the Director of ACDA, the Chief SALT Ambassador,
the Director of the CIA, and the President's National Security
Affairs advisor. Military participation in the process, such
as that by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remained at a subser-
vient level. Furthermore, the judgements of the JCS were
consistently overruled by civilians on a number of key out-
comes relevant to this analysis. As General Rowny, the
chief SALT representative of the JCS, testifies,
The Chiefs did not want to have a proto-
col, they did not want to constrain
cruise missiles at all, and they wanted
deeper reductions. They wanted and have
consistently wanted and recommended that
the Backfire be counted... I would say
in the main their objections were simply
overruled. *5
Despite these objections, the SALT II outcomes ex-
cluded the Backfire, included a Protocol, and subjected the
cruise missile to restrictions which the U.S. had explicitly
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maintained during the negotiations were not to be covered by
the agreement. In 1977, President Carter himself insisted
in a press interview that "we are not prepared to accept a
unilateral prohibition against the development of or deploy-
ment of the cruise missile absent some equivalent response
from the Soviet Union including the Backfire bomber." 36
However, at the negotiations the U.S. did not stick to this
position. As reflected in Department of Defense testimony




The Soviets insisted that SALT II
should contain some limits on SLCMs
and GLCMs, and it became clear in the
post-Vladivostok negotiations that an
agreement could not be concluded with-
out some GLCM and SLCM limits... 37
However, there was no equivalent cooperative exchange
on behalf of the Soviet Union.
As regards the composition of the U.S. SALT delega-
tion, it also reflected tremendous variations over time.
To date, it has had four different delegation heads. Fur-
thermore, characteristic of its make-up, the U.S. delega-
tion often displayed open bureaucratic divergencies during
the negotiations, thereby demonstrating a lack of U.S.
cohesiveness in respect to the issues being considered.
Consequently, this negotiating style effectively reinforced
the delaying action tactics utilized by the Soviet delega-




4. Back Channel Negotiations and the U.S. Delegation
A key area of criticism in respect to U.S. SALT nego-
tiation behavior centers upon the heavy reliance on secret
'back channel' negotiations and its subsequent effect upon
the eventual outcomes. Although the utilization of parallel
negotiation channels is useful in some negotiating circum-
stances, evidence suggest that, as used in SALT, such ex-
changes had an adverse affect upon outcome determination.
This is particularly true in respect to the SSBN and SLBM
launcher limits which were established in the Interim Agree-
ment and its respective Protocol.
Several motivational factors might explain this U.S.
dependence upon 'back channel' bargaining. First, as Garthoff
indicated, this method of negotiation suited Kissinger's
style of personal diplomatic involvement. However, he ob-
served that Kissinger "came to resent, and perhaps be jealous
of the professionals who were effective;" therefore, he "cur-
tailed the role of the professionals and in the process
38
spread himself too thin." Nixon's passion for secrecy was
also an important factor. As Paul Nitze explains,
Nixon had such a passion for secrecy and
such a lack of confidence in the reli-
ability and judgement of what he con-
sidered to be the bureaucracy, that not
even the head of the U.S. delegation
was kept precisely informed of what was
happening at the higher level. 3y
The secrecy surrounding these parallel high level
exchanges was in fact so tight that the American SALT
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negotiators first heard about them from members of the
Soviet delegation instead of from U.S. sources. 40
The pattern of parallel secret 'back channel 1 nego-
tiations also served the political needs of the Nixon Admin-
istration. As Garthoff wrote, Nixon "increasingly wanted
to achieve a SALT agreement as a symbol of a successful
41detente policy." Notes taken by Admiral Zumwalt in his
capacity as Chief of Naval Operations support Garthoff *
s
claim of a political linkage to SALT. In a conversation he
had with Kissinger, Zumwalt recorded,
K. spoke again about his pleasure that
he was able to overturn the bureaucracy
to keep SALT going, last August. I
suggested that one could always be suc-
cessful in negotiating with the Russians
if willing to move to their position.
He smiled and said, "Only three-quarters
of the way." I urged that we take longer
to debate the Soviets on each position
and not move too fast. K. said, "That's
easy for you to say, you don't have to
run for reelection."^
As Garthoff indicates, such political deadlines meant
Nixon had to aim "for a SALT agreement at the summit he had
planned for mid-1972, a few months before the national
election." Garthoff continues by observing that
For a time this involved a charade to
keep from reaching agreement on an
ABM Treaty too quickly, while in the
end it meant reaching agreement under
pressure involving haphazard personal
negotiations in the Kremlin with the
President and Dr. Kissinger seeking
to patch together an Interim Agree-
ment on levels of strategic offensive
ballistic missiles. 5

The issue over a separate ABM Treaty, as opposed to
the original intention of negotiating a single comprehensive
treaty, had been worked out by the first series of these
'back channel' negotiations in early 1971. By May 1971,
the ABM Treaty and its related understandings had been en-
tirely agreed upon. Thus, the crucial issues which remained
open for negotiation pertained to the interim measures to
restrict offensive strategic weapons. Specifically, the pri-
mary points of conflict concerned the issue of SLBM levels
and, secondly, the problem of defining and constraining
'heavy' ICBMs. This question of including SLBM launchers
in the Interim Agreement clearly reveals a process of nego-
tiation style which was less than optimum for the United
States
.
In February of 1971, in spite of strong bureaucratic
support for an established limit on submarine-launched ballis
tic missiles, Kissinger conveyed to the Soviets through the
secret 'back channel' that "the American side would not in-
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sist on their inclusion." To complicate the negotiation
aspects of SALT, this position was established without the
knowledge of the SALT delegation. Thus, the May 20 break-
through agreement which President Nixon declared as "a major
step in breaking the stalemate on nuclear arms talks" specif-
ically excluded provisions regarding SLBM limitations. As
Newhouse indicates,

Kissinger had not pressed for including
SLBMs in the May 20 accord. With the
Russians trailing the United States in
both the operational number and the
quality of boats, he feared that making
an issue of SLBM' s might produce another
stalemate . 5
As a result of this 'back channel' accord, the U.S.
SALT delegation lost important negotiating leverage. The
question of including a freeze on SLBM s had been an open
source of negotiation contention since May 1971. The Soviets,
however, did not believe the U.S. delegations persistent
efforts over the next ten month period to include SLBM s .
In large measure, this was because, as already noted, it had
received through the 'back channel' a clear indication from
Kissinger that the U.S. would not insist upon it.
Bureaucratic momemtum in support of SLBM inclusion
finally forced the White House to acquiesce to this position,
and as Newhouse points out,
Indeed, in the weeks preceeding the Moscow
May Summit, the SLBM limit had become
Washington's top priority item and the
toughest piece of bargaining in the back ^
channel, where it was finally worked out.
The available evidence on this SLBM limit is fragment-
ary and anecdotal. Zumwalt notes that
The President was seriously considering
the substance of the SLBM argument pro
and con while Kissinger was searching
for a tactic that would enable him to
wiggle around the issue. "Kissinger
said he didn't understand the logic of
the Chiefs that if SLBMs are not in-
cluded, the Chiefs want no treaty,"

reads a line in some notes I made at a
telephone conversation I had with Admiral
Moorer just after he had attended a Na-
tional Security Council meeting on SALT
on 17 March. 47
Zumwalt adds that Kissinger tried to bring additional
pressure upon the JCS. Admiral Moorer reportedly told Zumwalt
that "Kissinger says the President might order the JCS to
support a no-SLBM decision," but, as Zumwalt remarks, "That
was evidently merely Henry making a muscle. When the President
made his decision on 23 March, it went mostly the other way
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and in support of the JCS position on SLBMs."
The Soviets, who had been extremely tough and articu-
late about their position against SLBM inclusion were under-
standably not pleased with this sudden setback so late in the
negotiations. As the negotiation events unfolded, the U.S.
was able to gain Soviet acquiescence to SLBM inclusion after
'back channel' negotiations with Kissinger in April 1972.
However, the price in terms of Treaty outcome would be high.
The U.S. delegation, in accordance with their instuc-
tions, negotiated for a freeze at the current number of
Soviet SLBM launchers on submarines operational and under
construction. The Soviets, on the other hand, were adamant
on having a higher figure and on including only modern nuc-
lear submarine types. The interaction of domestic political
time and the mistake of making 'back channel' assurances by
Kissinger allowed the Soviets to take the negotiation ini-
tiative. A freeze would only be accepted in return for

numerical superiority in submarines and SLBM launchers. The
details of this arrangement were to be worked out during the
Moscow Summit in May 1972.
Historically, summits have functioned as a stamp of
approval for agreements which have for the most part already
been worked out. However, as Wolfe indicates, SALT Summits
have in practice "not turned out to be mere symbolic sessions
for rubberstamping previously prepared accords." Rather, he
notes, "They appear to have become in some degree vehicles
for direct intervention in the SALT negotiating process,
with the top leaders on both sides giving their attention to
substantive issues left unresolved through other avenues of
49
negotiation." As Gerald Steibel remarks, recent U.S.
negotiating behavior reflects a shift in the primary object
of negotiation. SALT has become an end in itself, rather
than just a means. This shift is underscored by the use of
summit diplomacy "before the specifics of agreements have
been worked out at lower levels --a frank departure from the
older axiom that the time for summitry was after the agree-
ments had been arrived at."
The outcomes which emerged from the Moscow Summit
negotiations reflected a major U.S. compromise on SLBM
replacement levels and produced an agreement which was
embedded with an imprecise and ambiguous treaty text. As
Garthoff notes, the Moscow negotiations by the Presidential
Party in May 1972
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contributed to the confusion and some
minor concessions and ambiguities for
SALT II that need not have been incurred.
Above all, they contributed greatly to
subsequent loss of credibility and doubt
over SALT and detente because of the
secret and haphazard way they were con-
cluded, and also because of the politi-
cal over-sell of the Moscow Summit.
Indeed, they represented a model of how
not to conduct negotiations - against
a political deadline, by an ill-pre-
pared political negotiation team (and
without the best technical negotiating
advise and assistance), seeking unat-
tainable objectives, and then settling
for murky and ambiguous cosmetic for- <-•,
mulations to cover over the situation.
This ambiguity opened up a number of exploitable loop-
holes for the Soviets, which took an additional two years of
negotiation to resolve. As was briefly discussed in the pre-
vious chapter, a major loophole existed in respect to Soviet
G-class SSB's and their respective SLBM launchers. Basically,
the interpretive controversy which ensued between the U.S.
and Soviet negotiators had two dimensions.
The first concerned the issue of retiring the SLBMs
deployed on the G-class submarines. According to the Protocol's
second provision, both older ICBM s and older SLBMs could be
replaced by an equal number of new SLBMs on Nuclear-powered
submarines. The Soviets interpreted this to mean that the
SLBMs on their G-class SSBs could be replaced with SLBMs on
modern submarines in order to reach the 950 ceiling author-
ized by the agreement. This would have upgraded the Soviet
SLBM force inventory while at the same time minimizing SALT'S

impact upon Soviet ICBM deactivation, which did not serve the
U.S. SALT objective of achieving maximum reductions in Soviet
ICBM throwweight. This dispute was not resolved until after
Treaty signature. On July 24, 1972, an agreed clarification
established that the 950 ceiling could only be reached by
52
retiring Soviet ICBMs. The point to emphasize here is
that this clarification should have been worked out prior
to any SALT agreement.
The second negotiated loophole relates to Soviet
efforts to modernize these same SLBM s . This issue was com-
plicated because of a new ambiguity in the definitions which
were established in the July 24 agreed clarification. As
defined in this agreement, modern SLBMs were said to be
SLBMs which were deployed on nuclear -powered submarines com-
missioned in the Soviet Union since 1965. Given this defini-
tion, the Soviets concluded that they were permitted to deploy
newer SLBM on the 22 G-class submarines, provided they had
not been previously deployed on any of their nuclear-powered
submarines. Furthermore, these were not to be counted in
the 740 and 950 SLBM launcher ceilings. Admiral Zumwalt
reportedly testified before the House Select Committee on
Intelligence that Kissinger
excluded from negotiations U.S. experts
who could have avoided ambiguous language
in the agreements.. 3
and added that Kissinger

entered into a secret agreement after
SALT I was signed to plug a loophole
resulting from "sloppy negotiating"
that would have permitted the USSR to
have an additional 210 SS-N-13 SLBMs
deployed on its diesel-powered Golf-
class submarines. 5 '*
This second loophole was not blocked until the Moscow
Summit in 1974, when 'modern' SLBMs were redefined to be those
SLBMs which had been developed after 1964, irrespective of
platform characteristics.
Henry Kissinger's account of the SLBM formula con-
veniently omits any mention of these post-SALT I negotiation
difficulties. According to him, the final compromise he and
his staff had finally drafted in May 1972 was that
We would not insist on counting the sixty
old missiles on G-class submarines in the
totals unless they were modernized, but
existing missiles on G-class boats could
not be "traded in" for missiles on new
submarines. This served two purposes.
To stay below the ceiling of 950, the
Soviets would have to dismantle ICBMs
and missiles on nuclear-powered sub-
marines; and they could not put modern
missiles on diesel boats except by rr
counting them - unlikely as this was...
If in fact these had been Kissinger's intentions, then
the SALT I outcomes clearly indicate that his negotiation
effort was unable to translate these objectives into a pre-
cisely defined negotiated document.
5 . U.S. Approaches in SALT II - The Case of Cruise Missiles
The SALT II negotiations on the cruise missile and the
Backfire bomber also reveal a weakness in respect to the U.S.
negotiation approach to SALT.

Throughout the SALT II negotiation process, Soviet
negotiators have been acutely sensitive to U.S. efforts to
develop cruise missiles and to transfer such technology to
NATO countries. Such a position was clearly reflected in an
article written by the Soviet news agency TASS , which argued
that the
program for building the so-called cruise
missiles which is being promoted by the
pentagon and the military industrial com-
plex, is not only in the way of a Soviet-
American agreement on strategic arms
limitation, but is fraught with consider-
able complications at future negotiations
between the two countries in the field. 56
In contrast to the inflexible and assertive position-
ing by the Soviets in respect to cruise missiles, the U.S.
response reflected a cooperative approach which continued to
compromise the American position in search of a mutually
acceptable solution. For example, in January 1977, President
Carter announced in an interview that he would not let dis-
agreement over the U.S. cruise missile and the Soviet Back-
57fire bomber stand in the way of a new SALT agreement. In
March 1977, the Soviets identifi-ed the cruise missile as the
chief obstacle to progress in the SALT II negotiations, and
refused to advance the pace of the talks until unilateral
concessions had been made by the U.S. in limiting cruise
missiles
.
Of interest is the fact that the U.S. had already
offered a number of major compromise solutions. For example,

as early as January 1976, the U.S. SALT II delegation offered
a compromise which attempted to link deployment of U.S. cruise
missiles to the deployment of the Soviet Backfire bomber.
Basically, this compromise offered the Soviets a limited
deployment of 250 Backfire bombers between 1977 and 1982.
After this period, the Soviets would have been permitted to
exceed this limit and deploy additional Backfires. In return,
the U.S. offered to restrict the deployment of SLCMs with a
range greater than 600km to no more than 25 surface ships
with a maximum of 10 missiles per ship. Neither the Backfires
nor the 250 SLCM s would be included as part of the SALT II
aggregate ceiling. Additionally, the U.S. consented to a
range limitation of 600km for submarine- launched cruise
5 8
missiles. The Soviets, however . were adamant about further
neutralization of long-range strategic cruise missiles, par-
ticularly the SLCM and GLCM variants, and were therefore un-
willing to accept this proposal. In an effort to secure even
more stringent limitations on the deployment of cruise missiles,
they countered the U.S. proposal with a series of their own.
They argued that all new and modern SLCMs and GLCMs were to
be limited to a range of 600km. Furthermore, bombers equipped
with ALCMs were to be counted under the 1,320 launcher ceiling
established at Vladivostok. Additionally, the Soviets con-
tinued to reject any attempts by the U.S. to link the status
of their Backfire bomber to the issue over cruise missiles.

At Geneva, in October 1977, the U.S. negotiation posi-
tion eroded further. Under the terms proposed, the U.S. sug-
gested that SLCMs and GLCMs be restricted to a range of 600km
for a Protocol period of 3 years. In exchange, there would
be no formal agreement restricting the Backfire bomber, pro-
viding the Soviets gave an assurance that deployment of the
Backfire bomber would not be in a mode which would be threaten-
ing to the U.S. These events underscore a weakness in the -
U.S. pattern of negotiation in respect to the cruise missile
and the Backfire bomber.
As previously indicated, proponents of the SALT II
Treaty argued that the limitations on SLCM and GLCM deploy-
ments are only temporary, and that they do not place serious
constraints upon the future deployment of the long-range
cruise missile program. However, the Soviets continued to
view things differently, and have clearly stated that a fail-
ure to extend the Protocol's provisions would be considered
contrary to the spirit of the SALT II Treaty. For example,
this Soviet perspective was clearly evident in the following
Pravda statement
These figures (U.S. SALT critics) would
like to remove from the limitations sea-
launched and surface-launched cruise
missiles. This is in fact a blatant
attempt to insure right now that after
the three-year term of the protocol
ends there is freedom of action to
develop such missiles and increase
their agreed range above 600km, and
ultimately to retain the possibility
of deploying them outside the United

States--that is, as close as possible to




It is surely obvious that
this is yet another attempt to emasculate
the limitations already agreed on and to
wreck the agreement as a whole. 5g
As Robert Moffit has asked,
If the Protocol does not really limit
American options on the cruise missile,
what is the point of Soviet persistence
and American agreement? If the United
States intends to proceed with its long-
range cruise missile program after the
three year Protocol expires, it is only
inviting a showdown three years hence. "0
6
. Defense Spending
In addition to the foregoing considerations, a rea-
sonable case can be made that disparity in defense spending
was also a contributing factor to Treaty outcome determination
It must be kept in mind, however, that analyses vary and ex-
perts disagree as to the magnitude of this disparity. All
apparently agree that the Soviet Union spends substantially
more than the United States. For example, a CIA comparison
between U.S. and Soviet defense spending trends published in
1979 indicated that between the years 1967-77, Soviet defense
spending (in constant 1970 prices) grew at an average annual
rate of about 4 to 5 percent, and that notwithstanding econo-
mic difficulties in other sectors of the economy, "all the
evidence available to us on Soviet defense programs underway
and planned suggests that the long-term upward trend in allo-
cation of resources to defense is likely to continue into
the 1980's." Of this spending, slightly over 10 percent
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of the total was allocated for intercontinental attack forces
subject to SALT II limitation, and "a SALT II agreement along
the lines currently being discussed would not, in itself,
significantly alter this projection." 62 A study by the Rand
Corporation revealed similar results: "the magnitude of the
disparity in many of the mission areas is impressively large:
a three-to-one advantage to the Soviet Union in strategic
ft %forces spending over the past half -decade .. ." Such examples
are succinctly illustrative of the political will behind
Soviet defense spending.
In contrast, throughout the SALT process, U.S. defense
spending has been constricted by budgetary factors. As
Kissinger indicates, at the time of SALT I, "at a time when
the Soviet buildup required urgent reexamination of strategic
doctrine and of forces, the energies of the Executive were
consumed by a rear guard action to preserve a minimal arsenal.
Pentagon planners were forced to concentrate on preserving
the existing force structure rather than adapting it to
64
changed circumstances." Fundamentally, societal con-
straints became a major inhibiting factor, as demonstrated
by a national mood during SALT I and much of SALT II that
was pervasively antimilitary and overwhelmingly hostile to
defense spending (as heightened by the domestic upheaval
over Vietnam) . Given such a domestically constrained at-
mosphere with increasing budgetary pressures directed against
defense spending, Kissinger argued that if the Administration

wanted to maintain an adequate defense program, it was "in-
creasingly pushed into the 'bargaining chip' rationale for
individual weapon programs - that is, arguing that it was
building them not to fulfill strategic purposes but in order
to give them up in arms control negotiations." Unfortunately,
examination of the Treaty outcomes demonstrates the incompati-
bility of such logic, given the contrasting negotiating
approaches between the U.S. and Soviets in SALT.
B. SOVIET NEGOTIATING STYLE
The orientation of Soviet negotiation style contrasted
sharply to that which governed the U.S. According to William
Van Cleave, the Soviets approach to SALT reflected both an
extension of politics and of strategy. Thus, the essence of
this approach stressed competition for advantage. Paul Nitze
has similar views, and argues that the Soviets have looked at
SALT primarily from their own political viewpoint and have
sought to optimize Soviet gains through a highly one-sided
negotiating strategy.
This approach finds substance in the underlying difference
in strategic doctrine between the Soviet Union and the United
States. In comparison to the U.S. view of mutual deterrence,
the Soviet conception of strategic stability does not embrace
the same functional strategic logic. Although highly con-
cerned about deterring a nuclear war, the Soviet prescription
for deterrence "stipulates that Soviet strategic forces and
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plans should strive in all available ways to enhance the
prospect that the Soviet Union could survive as a nation
and, in some politically and militarily meaningful way,
defeat the main enemy should deterrence fail - and by this
striving - help deter or prevent nuclear war, along with
the attainment of other strategic and foreign policy goals."
As Wolfe indicates, this approach has at times been labeled
"deterrence through denial."
The Soviet approach to SALT can be characterized as maxi-
malist positioning or sham bargaining, which requires taking
an extreme negotiation position at the outset of negotiations.
This negotiation technique offers several unique advantages.
First, it can be utilized as an information - seeking device.
Second, aside from attaining information, this approach can
be utilized to alter the minimum preferences of an opponent
in a direction more favorable to your own position. In line
with this, such a bargaining position makes it difficult
for an opponent to determine your own minimum negotiating
expectations. The U.S. approach in SALT, on the other hand,
was positioned somewhere between an equitable school of thought,
where the initial position taken appears reasonably fair to
both sides, and an integrative school of thought, where an
integrative process in negotiation is achieved through simul-
taneously proposing a number of potential solutions in search
of mutual interest which could form the basic foundation for
resolving the issues at hand. Kissinger's tandem series of
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negotiable options during SALT I typlified these negotiating
techniques. However, as has been noted, the consequence of
this action left the choice of issues up to the discretion
of the Soviets. As General Rowny relates,
We negotiate among ourselves, we want to
be believed, we want to be credible. So
we get things down to a lowest common
denominator and then we say with all the
fervor and conviction at our command that
we are going to stick to our position,
then we don't. We get into negotiations
with the Soviets and they say, and our
own people say as well, "You know, you
have to trade. There has to to some
give and take in this negotiating pro-
cess." So they sit us out, wait us out.
We then make another proposal. They
then pick and choose from our proposals.
They put together pieces and say "Well,
you have already agreed to those pieces 6 ~by offering them to us in your proposals."
The negotiating history of the SLCM outcome clearly attests
to the negotiating success of the Soviet approach during
SALT II.
The Soviets also utilized a variety of negotiating tactics
which supplemented their general SALT negotiating strategy.
Paul Nitze gives the following examples. The Soviets would
use words in other than their normally accepted sense, ex-
ploited the differences in nuance between Soviet words and
their English equivalents and would use imprecise language
in presenting provisions which would limit their side and
precise language where the object was to limit U.S. actions.
In relation to these negotiating techniques, it is significant
to note that at the Moscow Summit in 1972, when the outcomes

over SSBN and SLBM launcher limits were being negotiated,
neither Nixon or Kissinger utilized a State Department inter-
preter, but rather relied on Viktor Sukhodrev, who was
Brezhnev's assistant and interpreter. 69
Other Soviet negotiating tactics included delaying actions,
reversals, and repetition, all geared to try the patience of
U.S. negotiators in an effort to exact additional concessions.
Additional techniques frequently included arguments appealing
to trust or good intentions. To illustrate
The Soviet delegates refused to consider
arms balance equations on the basis of
the capabilities of the respective
weapons. Instead they insisted that
consideration be given to the "intent"
of the Soviet Union, which they dis-
cribed as peaceful. General Rowny
cites the Soviet Backfire bombers as
the "classic case." The Soviet dele-
gation repeatedly said that as the
Soviet Union had no intention of using
the Backfire against the continental
U.S. it, therefore could not be in-
cluded in the SALT agreement.™
Although these examples are by no means all inclusive,
they nevertheless reveal the existence of significant differ-
ences between the two contrasting approaches to SALT.
In comparison to the U.S. SALT delegation, the Soviet
military exercised predominant control over the Soviet dele-
gation. Indicative of this control of the Soviet military
over their civilian negotiators was Col. Gen. N. V. Ogarkov,
who, according to Newhouse, was clearly the most important
figure on the Soviet delegation, even though Semenov was
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71the nominal leader." At one point in the negotiations,
Ogarkov confided to the American negotiators that there was
no reason for the U.S. to disclose knowledge of Soviet weapon
systems to the civilian members of the Soviet delegation.
These matters, he warned, were strictly the concern of the
72Soviet military. The preeminent role of the Soviet military
was also apparent during both the Moscow and Vladivostok sum-
mit meetings in 1974. As Garthoff notes, although no U.S.
military representatives attended these summit meetings,
senior Soviet military representatives were closely consulted
by Brezhnev and directly participated in the actual negotia-
73
tions . In contrast with the JCS , whose recommendations on
a number of key SALT issues were overturned by civilians,
Soviet SALT policy formulation reflects a systemic bias on
military influence in SALT. To cite Wolfe,
it seems hardly disputable that through-
out SALT I and at least much of SALT II,
the military leadership has exerted a
strong, conservative influence on the
negotiations, and that the political
leadership- -whatever its bent may have
been- -has tended to eschew agreements
that, in the judgement of the military
professionals, might' adversely affect
the Soviet military posture. 74
The Soviet military's control over SALT is reflected in the
following character description of the chief Soviet SALT
negotiator, Vladimir S, Semenov.
Conscious of the predominance of the
military role in arms control negotia-
tions, he was particularly respectful
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of the military on the Soviet delegation
and always deferred to the delegation as
a whole when new lines and approaches
emerged in negotiations, even in such
minor matters as a recess. He displayed
also a particular hypersensitivity about
disclosing any military secrets and re-
vealed the civilians ill-at-ease in the
presence of military authority. 5
Viewed in terms of the institutional setting and processes
within which Soviet SALT policy is formulated, the following
i
asymmetries require mention. In contrast to the pluralistic
society of the U.S., the Soviet Union has no independent
interest groups which lobby for a particular SALT position.
As Wolfe notes, in the Soviet Union,
There is no body of informed opinion on
SALT and national security issues inde-
pendent of, and therefore capable of
criticizing official government posi-
tions. In the public sphere, neither
an inquiring press nor lobbies of
defense, scientists and other know-
ledgeable experts play an active role
in the Soviet Union in fostering public




However, given the traits of our open society, the Soviet
government was able to try and change a U.S. SALT position
by editorializing and influencing public opinion in the U.S.
An example of such Soviet propaganda efforts was an article
written in the New York Times by Genrikh Trofimenko. Playing
upon public sentiment, he attempted to influence SALT II
ratification by arguing
many senators are arguing that nothing
will happen if the SALT II Treaty is not
ratified. But if this happens, won't
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this step push the world to another war
that will be immeasurably more disastrous
than the Second? 77
Another asymmetry lies in the legislative sphere. In the
U.S. there exists a Congress with independent powers from the
executive, which have profoundly influenced decisions in re-
spect to SALT. However, in the Soviet Union, there is no
independent legislative body with equivalent influence. The
Supreme Soviet therefore acts only in a symbolic fashion,
giving only pro forma approval to SALT decisions made
elsewhere.
As already noted, a third asymmetrical dimension is re-
flected in access to knowledge. The U.S. has extremely poor
knowledge of Soviet decision-making, whereas the Soviets have
an excellent opportunity to develop ample knowledge from a
variety of sources.
Fourth, in contrast to the bureaucratic variations in
the U.S. SALT organizational and control mechanisms,' the
Soviets displayed continuity over time, in both control and
the composition of the Soviet delegation. For example, Deputy
Foreign Minister Vladimir S. Semenov was chief of the Soviet
SALT delegation for over eight years.
At this juncture, it is difficult to determine how signi-
ficant an impact these various asymmetries in political cul-
ture, institutional settings etc. have had in determining
the outcomes in question. In themselves, these asymmetries
have offered the Soviets important exploitable advantages in
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conducting protracted arms control negotiations with the
U.S. However, the foregoing examination reveals that asym
metries between Soviet and U.S. negotiation methodology-
typified the differences between the two societies and cul
tures and were therefore of decisive importance in deter-




This thesis has had two fundamental objectives. The
first was to identify key SALT outcomes with naval implica-
tions. On balance, one is drawn to the conclusion that SALT
has had an asymmetrical impact upon the overall naval capa-
bilities of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Although sys-
tematically constraining the force structure of the U.S.
Navy with a high potential of affecting its strategic nuclear
war-fighting, intra-war deterrence and sea control mission
effectiveness (particularly in a tactical nuclear environ-
ment)
,
SALT has on the other hand allowed the overall capa-
bilities of the Soviet Navy vis-a-vis the U.S. Navy to expand
significantly.
The principal SALT naval outcomes support this conclusion
The ABM Treaty prevents both sides from developing a sea-
based ABM, but the U.S. is at a disadvantage because it is
the Soviets who have distinct superiority in both land-
based and sea-based ballistic missile throwweight. Indeed,
Soviet sea-based tactical nuclear capabilities excel those
of the U.S. by a significant margin, and only the Soviets
have claimed to be developing a land-based anti-ship ballis-
tic missile capability. The 1972 Interim Agreement awarded
the Soviets higher SSBN and SLBM ceilings. The SALT II
Treaty, while calling for equal aggregate levels of strategic
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nuclear launchers, continued the naval "loopholes" of SALT I
(e.g., exclusion of Soviet diesel SLBM- launchers) and main-
tained Soviet throwweight advantages. Finally, the SALT II
Protocol, taken in context of the Statement of Principles
for SALT III, could potentially prevent the realization of
the American SLCM program - while exampting already deployed
Soviet SLCMs.
The second objective of this thesis was to try to explain
these SALT outcomes by testing the hypothesis that outcome
determination was primarily the function of asymmetries in
negotiation approaches. In view of the findings, one is
left with the following enigma. Can we isolate negotiation
approaches from the society as a whole and all the contribut-
ing factors that combine to produce the negotiation approach?
As this study has indicated, these factors, such as strategic
doctrine, bureaucratic processes, defense spending, etc.,
all influence the makeup of a nation's negotiation approach.
If it can be accepted as analytically defensible to focus on
negotiating approaches in themselves, it seems clear that
the U.S. took a different approach -- one that rewarded the
Soviet approach to negotiation, at least so far as the naval
outcomes of SALT.
Given the Soviet Union's social and political structure
and the negotiation approach that structure naturally pro-
motes, and given the negotiation approach the U.S. is led
to naturally, the asymmetrical naval outcomes in SALT are
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understandable. If the U.S. is to do better, the U.S. must
try harder. In a word, we must learn to overcome our own
cultural constraints in order to negotiate with the Soviets
effectively. We must learn from the Soviets.
The asymmetries reviewed in Chapter III provide a check-
list of lessons that may be learned by the U.S. For example,
in striking contrast to the Soviet pattern of negotiation in
SALT, the U.S. has failed to give the military a decisive role
and responsibility in SALT decision-making policy and in the
actual conduct of the negotiations. The U.S. has failed to
evaluate the military implications of particular SALT pro-
visions from an analytical and strategic viewpoint other than
"mutual assured destruction," which is increasingly recognized
as inadequate. The U.S. has failed to pursue a consistent
policy with respect to negotiating objectives. Similarly,
the U.S. has failed to maintain consistency and coherence in
its SALT planning and negotiation institutions; indeed, on
several occasions, U.S. institutions have been by-passed -
as during the "back-channel" episodes. The U.S. has, unlike
the Soviet Union, accelerated negotiations and made hasty
concessions at "summit" conferences in order to meet the
exigencies of domestic U.S. political deadlines. Finally,
as concerns defense spending, the U.S. has consciously nego-
tiated with a "weak hand" - that is, with the knowledge that
it did not have the Congressional and public backing neces-
sary for credibility (derived from relevant strategic weapons
programs) in such negotiations.

If the U.S. were negotiating with (for example) the
British, our established approach to arms control negotia-
tions would be appropriate. On the other hand, if the Soviets
were negotiating with (for example) the Chinese, they in turn
might not be so successful. However, the conflicting com-
bination of the U.S. and Soviet negotiation approaches in
SALT has simply not been to our advantage in terms of outcome
determination. If such asymmetrical SALT naval outcomes are
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